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ABSTRACT 
Forty years ago, the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund were negotiated at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire. The Bank and the Fund were parts of an overall American 
program designed, by redressing the mistakes of the twenties and 
thirties, to stimulate international trade and investment so as 
to raise living standards throughout the world. It was a program based 
on the dreams of economists and brought to fruition in the One World 
atmosphere of the administration of Franklin Roosevelt. While their 
mode of operating has changed, the Fund and the Bank have maintained 
their international approach and are now able for this reason to 
intervene in the economies of member countries so as to improve the 
economy of the world. 
BRETTON WOODS: A RETROSPECTIVE ESSAY 
Robert W. Oliver, Ph.D. 
California Institute of Technology 
As the Bretton Woods Conference neared its conclusion in July, 
1944, there was an atmosphere of gloom. The Soviet delegation 
persisted in its refusal to agree to a World Bank subscription of 
$1,200 million, matching, thereby, the Soviet quota in the International 
Monetary Fund. Acting under strict instructions from Moscow, the 
delegation indicated reservations on other matters as well. In particular, 
it wanted guarantees that gold pledged for the Soviet Bank subscription 
and Fund quota would never actually leave the Soviet Union. It sought 
assurances that favorable interest rates would be charged on Bank loans 
for Soviet reconstruction. 
Then, at the closing plenary session on July 22, United States 
Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the Conference, Henry Morgenthau, 
Jr., suddenly received word that the Soviet Union would accept its proposed 
Bank subscription after all. Morgenthau added to his announcement of this 
news his belief that this event "is fraught with more significance and more 
hopeful meaning for the future of the world than any which those of 
us here have heard so far."l To the ovation of the delegates, 
Comrade M. S. Stepanov, Deputy Peoples Commissar of Foreign Trade 
and head of the Soviet delegation, stood, bowed and smiled 
1. Department of State, Proceedings and Documents of United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods. New Hampshire, July 
1-22, 1944 (2 vols.; Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1948), p. 1108. 
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with pleasure. He enjoyed the role of jolly good fellow. Indeed, a few 
moments later, supposing that applause directed to another was 
actually meant for him, Stepanov stood and bowed again, though he 
warned that special consideration must be given to countries "which have 
suffered from enemy hostilities.,,2 
The United States Director of Economic Stabilization (later 
Secretary of the Treasury and then Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court), Fred Vinson, quickly moved to amend the articles of the Bank 
in whatever manner was necessary to make allowance for the change in 
the Soviet subscription. ''We march to victory together," Vinson 
orated. "We march on the paths of peace together.,,3 
The gloom was lifted; the fragile Soviet-Western Alliance had 
not yet been torn asunder. President Roosevelt sent a message to the 
delegates which was read by Secretary Morgenthau. It said in part: 
[The delegates] have prepared two further foundation stones for the 
structure of lasting peace and security. They have shown that the 
people of the United Nations can work together to plan the peace 
as well as fight the war. 4 
Lord (John Maynard) Keynes, head of the United Kingdom 
delegation, concluded his remarks by saying: 
2. Ibid., p. 1112. 
3. Ibid., p. 1108. The United States delegation had agreed to increase 
its Bank subscription to offset the Soviet shortfall. With the last-
minute increase in the Soviet subscription, the total capital of the 
Bank became $9.1 billion, $300 million more than the total capital of the 
Fund. 
4. The New York Times, July 23, 1944, p. 24. 
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We have perhaps accomplished something more significant than what 
is embodied in this final act. We have shown that a concourse of 
forty-four nations are actually able to work together at a 
constructive task in amity and unbroken accord. Few believed it 
possible. If we can continue in a larger task as we have begun in 
this limited task, there is hope for the world. • •• If we can 
continue, this nightmare ••• will be over. The Brotherhood of Man 
will have become more than a phrase. 5 
II 
The Bretton Woods Conference did not take place in a world 
devoid of other news. The Democratic National Convention met in 
Chicago in July, 1944, and nominated Franklin Roosevelt for a fourth 
term. While the convention was in progress, Roosevelt met with 
Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur in Pearl Harbor to discuss the 
options of landing ground forces on Formosa (Taiwan) or the 
Philippines. Russian troops, already in Poland, Lithuania, Rumania 
and Czechoslovakia, appeared ready to push on to the Danube and across 
it into Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Indeed, the Soviet advance was so 
rapid that the British were uneasy about the implications for Greece 
and the Balkans. On the Western Front, the British Eighth and the 
American Fifth armies, having occupied Rome, were advancing northward 
in Italy toward the Po Valley, and General Patten's Third Army was 
about to begin its famous end run around Normandy, up the Loire and 
across the Seine. 
The "One World" atmosphere in which the Bretton Woods 
conference adjourned was under some strain. The Soviet Bretton Woods 
5. The New York Times, July 24, 1944, p. 1. 
4 
delegation remained in Washington for discussions about the future of 
American Lend-Lease assistance to the Soviet Union, but nothing was agreed. 
The Russians had no flexibility to depart from instructions from 
Moscow, and the Americans were upset by the concurrent Soviet acquiescence 
in the slaughter of Warsaw Poles by the retreating German Army.6 
The Yalta Conference took place in February, 1945, with ostensible 
accord but underlying tension. Stalin agreed to co-sponsor a conference in 
April at San Francisco to create a United Nations Organization, and 
three-power commissions were set up to oversee the formation of new 
governments in Rumania and Poland. In early March, however, the Russians 
unilaterally imposed puppet regimes in both these countries. Without 
consulting the three-power commission on Rumania, Andrei Vishinski, Soviet 
Deputy Foreign Minister, demanded that Rumanian King Michael dismiss the 
Prime Minister and accept a Soviet sponsored replacement. The three-power 
commission on Poland couldn't even agree on which Poles to talk to about a 
new government. W. Averell Harriman for the United States and Sir 
Archibald Clark-Kerr for the United Kingdom pressed the case of the Polish 
government-in-exile in London, but V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissioner (and 
Foreign Minister),- backed the de facto government in place in Warsaw. The 
Soviets were as determined then as now to control the governments of 
adjacent countries. 
Two weeks before his death on April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt 
wrote to Premier Stalin to present the United States point of view about 
6. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Co., 1969) p. 85. 
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Poland, but the difference of opinion remained unresolved. On April 21, on 
his way to the San Francisco conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, 
who had been reluctant to visit the United States at that time, called upon 
President Harry Truman in Washington, but the discussion was not 
harmonious. The deadlock over Poland continued. Molotov objected at San 
Francisco to the seating of a delegation from Argentina, for Argentina had 
not declared war against Germany; he was annoyed at Western sponsorship of 
France as a Big Five power; and he left San Francisco while the conference 
was still in session -- on May 9, the day after the Germans surrendered. 
Three days later, President Truman announced the termination of 
Lend-Lease assistance to the Soviets, an event which had profound 
repercussions. During a twelve day visit by Harry Hopkins to Moscow, 
beginning on May 26, there was a brief period of renewed harmony: 
Stalin agreed to ratify the United Nations Charter, and a Big Three 
Conference to be held in Potsdam was arranged. At Potsdam in July, 
however, Stalin seemed preoccupied with the cessation of Lend-Lease, as 
he and the new American president agreed on little. 
On August 24, 1945, ten days after V-J Day, President Truman, in 
what he later called his greatest mistake, stunned the British with the 
announcement that all Lend-Lease assistance was officially terminated. 7 
Winston Churchill commented: 
I cannot believe that so great a nation whose lend-lease policy 
was characterized by me as the most unsordid act in the history 
7. See Ibid., p. 28, and The New York Times February 15, 1950. 
For a moving account of the reaction of Lord Keynes and of important 
Americans then in London, see R. F. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes 
(New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1951), pp. 595-96. 
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of the world would proceed in such a rough and harsh manner as to 
hamper a faithful ally •••• 8 
It had been assumed by the British that Lend-Lease assistance would 
continue for sometime after the unconditional surrender of Japan. Indeed, 
it was because of that assumption that the British agreed to maintain their 
economy essentially on a war-time basis following the German surrender, and 
why definitive plans for emergency American reconstruction assistance to 
its wartime allies were not more fully developed when the war ended. 
Part of the difficulty was that the Japanese surrender took place 
sooner after the German surrender than anyone had foreseen (eighteen 
months was an assumed period for "Phase Two"), but Big Three 
negotiations about the extent of American Lend-Lease assistance and its 
termination had always been vague. As early as June, 1942, during a 
conference with V. M. Molotov about a second front, Harry Hopkins, who 
initially managed the Lend-Lease program and was a close confident of 
President Roosevelt, asked Roosevelt if he wanted then to discuss a special 
post-war fund for reconstruction,9 but the issue was put off. 
The continuation of Lend-Lease assistance after V-E day, at 
least to the British, was considered, but not agreed to at the Quebec 
Conference in September, 1944. The continuation of Lend-Lease after the 
cessation of hostilities was among the bold moves Harry Hopkins believed 
necessary if the world economy was to be restored and developed in accordance 
with Roosevelt's goals as set forth in the Atlantic Charter and Article VII of 
8. The New York Times, September 25, 1945, p. 5. 
9. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1948), p. 572. 
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the Master Lend-Lease Agreement.10 But the possibility of a Lend-
Lease program to finance reconstruction died with Franklin Roosevelt 
in April, 1945. So, for all practical purposes, did Big Three 
cooperation. Roosevelt had preferred to negotiate the biggest issues 
directly with other heads of state, and he had confided his intentions 
and personal commitments to few. 
In the fall of 1945, after the termination of Lend-Lease, many 
nations, including the Soviet Union, sought reconstruction loans from 
the United States government, but only the British application was 
submitted to Congress and acted upon favorably. Other governments were 
told to look to the Export-Import Bank whose lending capacity was 
increased on August 4, 1945, from $700 million to 3.5 billion, or to the 
as yet unborn International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
The Soviet Union failed to meet the December 31, 1945, deadline 
for ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreements. Soviet observers 
attended the Inaugural Meetings of the Bank and the Fund in April, 1946, 
at which the deadline for ratification by charter members was extended 
to December 31, 1946. But the Soviet Union never joined. 
10 Ibid, p. 819. See also Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell 
Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948) pp. 1613-1614, and Harrod, pp. 586-91. 
In 1950, an eminent British economist who asked not to be identified 
told me that, in high level British government circles, it was supposed 
that there would be a general postwar Lend-Lease settlement among the 
Allies based on some estimate of their relative contributions to the 
war effort. For an interesting discussion of the concept of pooling 
resources in an all-out war effort without regard to financial accounting 
see Jean Monnet, Memoirs, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1978) pp. 17-26; 53-77; and 150-69. During World War II 
Professor E. F. Penrose suggested that Lend-Lease be made retroactive 
so that the United States might reimburse the United Kingdom 
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The "One World" dream of Franklin Roosevelt, Wendell Wilkie and the 
United States Treasury Department was over. As George Kennan was 
later to observe: 
• • • nowhere in Washington had the hopes entertained for postwar 
collaboration with Russia been more elaborate, more naive, or more 
tenaciously (one might almost say ferociously) pursued than in the 
Treasury Department. 
Now at long last, with the uncomprehensible unwillingness of 
Moscow to adhere to the Bank and the Fund, the dream seemed to be 
shattered, ••• 11 
The war-time cooperation which united the military opponents of 
Hitler was probably necessary to induce the subsequent peace-time 
economic cooperation, but it was not enough to preclude the 
Cold-War antagonisms of the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Aside from a commitment to super-national authority, the only 
inducement to Soviet membership in the World Bank was the prospect 
of a huge reconstruction loan on favorable terms. Membership 
in the Monetary Fund did not seem important: since the Soviet 
Union does not incur "temporary balance-of-payments deficits" in the 
usual sense, protecting their gold seemed more important to the Soviets 
for British investments in the United States liquidated to pay 
for war supplies before Lend-Lease assistance officially began. See 
E. F. Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 17. For an illustration of 
isolationist reaction to the Lend Lease Act, see Arthur H. Vandenberg, 
Jr., editor, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 9-12. In his diary, on March 8, 
1941, Senator Vandenberg wrote about the Lend-Lease Act: "If America 
'cracks up' you can put your finger on this precise moment as the time 
when the crime was committed." Vanderburg subsequently became a 
staunch supporter of a bipartisan, internationalist foreign policy. 
11. George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1967), pp. 192-3. 
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than short-term loans from the Monetary Fund. Control of Eastern 
Europe seemed more important to Stalin than membership in Western 
dominated international economic organizations. Thus, when Europeans 
gathered in Paris in June, 1947, to respond to Secretary-of-State 
George Marshall's offer of massive reconstruction assistance, Soviet 
Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov arrived with eighty advisors, only to 
leave shortly thereafter refusing to cooperate in an enterprise which 
would infringe on Soviet sovereignty. 
It can, of course, never be known whether a continuation of Big 
Three cooperation would have induced the Soviet Union to participate in 
the World Bank and the Monetary Fund, nor can it be known how those 
organizations might have evolved with the Soviet Union as a member. 
Participation would have brought the Soviets many problems, and the 
organizations themselves might have been torn assunder by centrifugal force. 
On the other hand, a world-wide commitment to increased trade and the 
reduction of poverty might have borne more fruit in the absence of Cold-
War antagonisms and a nuclear arms race. In time, Soviet leaders might 
have opened their economy to western inspection and influence and 
reduced their messianic pugnacity. They might have become less fearful 
of the West and, therefore, less belligerent. Given the antagonisms of 
the interwar years, the paranoia of Soviet leaders, and the impatience 
of Western governments, however, the Soviets decided that the costs of 
cooperation with the West exceeded the benefits, and they withdrew 
behind the "Iron Curtain," dragging their neighbors with them. 
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III 
In a sense, the attempt to include the Soviet Union in 
post-war economic planning was a quirk of fate. The American and 
British experts who drafted economic plans for the post-war world 
labored in a united-nations atmosphere. They supposed, that is to say, 
that all of the nations united against the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis 
should be included in whatever political and economic organizations 
might emerge after the war. After June 21, 1941, when Hitler's troops 
invaded Russia, therefore, it came to be supposed that Soviet, British 
and American peace aims were, or could be made, as harmonious as their 
war aims. But the Bretton Woods organizations were designed to serve 
market-oriented, as distinct from state-controlled, economies, and they 
sought particularly to redress the American and Western European mistakes of 
the inter-war, particularly the depression, years. 
Together with many Americans, President Roosevelt regretted the 
unwillingness of the United States to participate in the League of 
Nations and sought, when the time was right,12 to reverse that decision 
by sponsoring a United Nations Organization committed to reducing 
international political (and military) competition and to improving the 
lot of people everywhere in the world. As a practical politician, 
Roosevelt also sought to win the support of uncommitted nations in the 
struggle against Germany, Italy and Japan. Thus, well before the 
12. He was unwilling to include any reference to an international 
organization in drafts of the Atlantic Charter. See Sherwood, p. 359. 
11 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, in his Third Inaugural Address 
(January 6, 1941 -- just eight days after the Fireside Chat in which he 
introduced the concept of Lend-Lease and declared that I~e must be the 
great arsenal of Democracy"), Roosevelt promised a post-war 
world based on Four Freedoms: Freedom of speech and expression; 
Freedom to worship, Freedom from want, and Freedom from fear. 
Though negotiations with the British about the wording of the 
Master Lend-Lease Agreement dragged on for nearly a year thereafter,13 
the first Lend-Lease appropriation was passed by the Congress in March, 
1941. The Atlantic Charter was agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill at 
sea, off the coast of Newfoundland, in August, 1941. The United States 
and the United Kingdom, after the Nazis had been defeated, would 
"endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further 
the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victors or vanquished, of 
access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world 
which are needed for their economic prosperity." 
Article VII of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, which was 
eventually signed bilaterally by the United States and fifteen other 
governments -- including the Soviet Union, specified that the terms of a 
Lend-Lease settlement "shall be such as not to burden COmmerce between 
the two countries but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations 
between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To 
13. The difficulty lay in the reluctance of the British to negotiate 
away imperial preferential tariffs. See Acheson, pp. 27-34, 
and Harrod, pp. 515-17. 
12 
that end, they shall include provision for agreed action • • • directed 
to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, 
of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, 
which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all 
peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade 
barriers " The contracting parties further stipulated that "at 
an early convenient date, conversations shall be begun. • • with a 
view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the 
best means of attaining the above stated objectives •• •• " 
The post-war planners not only labored in a united-nations 
atmosphere, they labored in an atmosphere of contemplated freer 
trade. Much of the hardship of the depression was blamed on 
nationalistic politics which had sought to decrease each nation's imports, 
thereby exporting unemployment. Western economists had long taught 
that the greatest prosperity of the world and its component parts could 
be achieved only if barriers to trade were removed, and the post-war 
planners set out to make this dream come true. 
Eliminating discriminatory treatment in international commerce 
and reducing tariffs and other trade barriers were long-standing goals 
of the State Department, of Secretary-of-State Cordell Hull in 
particular. Indeed, between 1943 and 1945, State Department experts 
drafted a charter for an International Trade Organization (I.T.O.) 
which would have overseen the reduction of trade barriers and trade 
discrimination. The charter was modified at various international 
13 
meetings and finally agreed to by representatives of fifty-three 
nations at a conference in, of all places, Havana, Cuba, in March, 
1948. By that time, however, the Cold War was well underway and the 
political composition of the United States Congress had changed from 
what it had been in the Roosevelt era. The charter was resoundingly 
condemned by the Soviet Union, and then, by inaction, rejected by the 
Congress of the United States. The Soviet Union preferred bilateral to 
multilateral trade bargaining and argued that free international trade 
would only strengthen control of the world by capitalist nations. The 
American Congress was concerned that the I.T.O. Charter dealt with too 
many subjects and, with a one-nation one-vote system similar to that of 
the United Nations, provided the United States with too little voting 
power. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, negotiated among 
thirty-three countries in 1947 as an interim agreement on international 
commercial policy until the I.T.O. came into existence, then became a 
permanent, renewable accord under the auspices of which various 
rounds of tariff cutting negotiations have been held. Thus, the 
commercial policy objectives of the International Trade Organization 
have been largely attained through informal machinery to which the 
President of the United States can adhere under the provisions of 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement legislation. (The President is enjoined not 
to reduce tariffs so much as to injure American industry, however, 
unless he explains his action to Congress.) 
State Department experts were not only concerned with issues of 
14 
protection, trade discrimination, trade between governments, cartels 
and restrictive business practices, they were concerned about foreign-
exchange controls and, therefore, foreign-exchange rates and markets. 
In the early depression years, trade had been disrupted not only by 
import quotas and rising tariffs but also by competitive currency 
depreciations and blocked foreign-currency accounts. But foreign-
exchange issues were the concern of the Treasury Department. 
IV 
In 1934, it became illegal for Americans to hold gold. Even 
the Federal Reserve Banks were obliged to sell their gold to the United 
States Treasury, receiving gold certificates or bookkeeping claims 
against Treasury gold in return. Only the Treasury could legally keep 
gold not used in industry. The Secretary of the Treasury was also 
instructed by Congress to buy silver so long as its stocks of silver 
were less than one-fourth of the total value at official prices of gold 
and silver combined. A $2 billion Exchange Stabilization Fund created 
in 1934 was placed under the authority of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. The Treasury Department became the official manager of 
United States gold and, therefore, together with the Federal Reserve 
System, of the external value of the dollar. 
In 1934, a Division of Research and Statistics was established 
within the Treasury, the staff of which gathered data and prepared 
reports on such subjects as '~he Supply of Gold and Silver Appropriate 
to our Monetary Needs," "Should U. S. Establish a Free Gold Market?," 
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Why Has the U. S. Acquired So Much Gold?," and "Studies of the 
International Competitive Positions of Various Countries.,,14 It was 
within this Division, directed by Dr. Harry White (a brilliant, young, 
Harvard Ph. D. who, in 1945 became Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury) that the initial American plans for a World Bank and a 
Monetary Fund were drafted. 
For roughly thirty-five years before World War I and again in the 
late 1920s, the major currencies of the world were tied to each other 
through gold. So long as gold was freely exchangeable by central banks and 
treasuries for domestic currencies at fixed prices, the external values of 
various currencies were established. But this system was interrupted by 
World War I, following which, in the early twenties, some currencies, most 
notably the French franc, fluctuated freely -- buffeted, as it was supposed 
at the time, by speculation as well as by changes in the underlying factors 
affecting the volume and direction of international trade and investment. 
In 1931, when the Bank of England ran out of gold, the gold-exchange system 
collapsed. The Bank of England no longer bought and sold gold at 
permanently fixed prices, and the external value of sterling fluctuated 
more or less freely in response to basic balance-of-payments forces. 
14. Copies of these and other studies may be found among the personal 
papers of Dr. Harry White (The White Papers) in the Princeton University 
Library. For information about Dr. Harry White, see David Rees, Harry 
Dexter White (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1973]; Nathan I. 
White, Harry 1h. White -- Loyal American (published privately by Bessie 
(White) Bloom, 1956); and John Morton Blum, Roosevelt and Morgenthau, a 
Revision and condensation of From the Morgenthau Diaries (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970). 
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During the thirties a new device for managing exchange 
rates (and sterilizing gold imports) began to be used. In the United 
States and many continental European countries, it was called an 
Exchange Stabilization Fund; in Great Britain, the Exchange 
Equalisation Account. These funds consisted of assets (gold or 
government bonds) which could be used to deal in foreign currencies, 
thus influencing exchange rates. They were managed by governments or 
central banks to offset speculation, which induced undue day-to-day 
fluctuations in exchange markets; to sterilize the domestic monetary 
effects of purchases or sales of foreign exchange or gold; and to keep 
foreign exchange rates at levels regarded as more or less "correct" 
from a national point of view. 
The prototype fund was the British Exchange Equalisation Account 
which was established in 1932, shortly after the Bank of England had been 
relieved by Parliament of the obligation to sell gold on demand at a fixed 
sterling price. The Account was owned by the British Treasury but managed 
by the Bank of England. Initially, it could only buy foreign currencies 
it had no foreign currencies to sell, so it could prevent the pound from 
rising but not from falling. Over time, however, as it acquired gold-
convertible currencies (first dollars then French francs), it acquired gold 
which it could resell as needed to prevent the pound from falling. So long 
as it had both gold and treasury securities, it could stabilize the 
foreign-exchange value of sterling at a desired level. ls 
15. Shortly after the E.E.A. was established, an inflow of short-term 
funds strengthened the pound; the E.E.A. was able to acquire a substantial 
stock of gold while selling sterling so as to prevent the pound from rising. 
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For its part, the American Fund started with gold with which it could 
acquire dollars from the U.S. Treasury.16 Occasionally it bought 
pounds or francs in order to keep the dollar from rising, but it 
immediately sold these foreign currencies for gold with which it 
replenished its stock. It never reversed this operation, however, and 
could not keep the dollar from falling. 
In the early days of the New Deal, the external value of the 
dollar fell as the dollar price of gold rose or, as some prefer to 
say, the dollar was devalued. In 1933, the external value of the 
dollar seemed unimportant; the domestic price level was of 
primary concern. It was supposed that a way out of the depression 
was to restore pre-depression prices, and that prices would rise as 
the price of gold rose. During 1933 and 1934, the dollar price of 
American imports and import competing goods did rise. So did 
production, but the depression continued, and, though he still had the 
authority, the President lost interest in further changing the price of 
gold. The dollar price of gold remained at $35 an ounce from January, 
1934, until December, 1971. 
By 1936, it began to appear that the dollar might become 
overvalued relative to other currencies as a result of managed currency 
depreciations (increases in the foreign currency prices of gold) 
abroad. The dangers of trade discrimination inherent in the use of 
exchange controls as practiced by countries (e.g. Germany) with overvalued 
16. The dollar value of Treasury gold rose by almost 70% between April, 
1933 and February, 1934. Two billion dollars of this book-keeping profit was 
transferred from the Treasury to the Stabilization Fund. 
18 
currencies were also beginning to be appreciated. Thus, Treasury (and 
State) Department officials began to think in terms of an international 
currency stabilization agreement consistent with balance-of-payments 
equilibrium. The objective was to preserve for the United States a bit 
of the competitive edge which had resulted from the 1933-34 devaluation 
while providing an international exchange-rate system compatible with 
international free trade. 
On September 25, 1936, Secretary of the Treasury, Henry 
Morgenthau, Jr., announced a Tripartite Agreement between the British, 
French and Americans under the terms of which the three governments 
agreed to consult with each other about pound-frane-dollar exchange 
rates. They also agreed to maintain the gold values of their 
respective currencies for periods of twenty-four hours so 
that their respective funds could intervene in exchange markets on a 
daily basis without the risk of losing gold. After affirming a 
"common desire to foster those conditions which safeguard peace and 
will best contribute to the restoration of order in international 
relations ••• ", Secretary Morgenthau invited "the cooperation 
of other nations to realize the policy laid down in the present 
declaration. ,,17 
Given international consensus on the desirability of 
maintaining equilibrium and reasonably stable exchange rates, 
17. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.Q!!. the State of the 
Finances for the fiscal year ended June ~ 1937, Washington, D.C: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 258-59. 
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prototype exchange stabilization funds, and the willingness of the 
United States to maintain a constant dollar price for gold and to pay 
gold to foreign governments and central banks on demand,18 the basic 
ingredients for an international monetary fund were available. A 
combined U. S.- U. K.- French stabilization fund could have been 
instituted in 1936 to intervene in foreign exchange markets as needed 
to maintain exchange-rate stability on a day-to-day basis while 
exchange rates fluctuated in response to longer run market fotces. 
Such a fund could have been augmented by internationally 
acceptable assets contributed by and, therefore, available to other 
governments willing to abide by the agreement. But it took the common 
purpose of the war and the specific instrument of the Lend-Lease 
agreements to induce such an accord. Details had to be worked 
out. How large a fund was needed, initially, and in the future? What 
portion of the fund should each member nation contribute and be able 
to use, and under what circumstances? When should exchange rates be 
allowed or induced to change? To what extent should the managers of 
the fund concern themselves with national policies and actions which 
might affect international payments? In the determination of the 
policies of the fund, how many votes should each government have? 
What peculiar advantages and obligations might accrue to the United 
18. This third condition was not essential. It was dropped from the 
international monetary system on August 5, 1971, when President Nixon 
closed the American gold window -- when, that is to say, President Nixon 
ordered the Treasury Department to refrain from selling gold to foreign 
governments, central banks and the International Monetary Fund for dollars 
at any price. 
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States as a result of its commitment to sell gold on demand for 
dollars held by foreign central banks and governments? 
v 
Shortly after the British and American Lend-Lease discussions 
began in the spring of 1941, Dr. Harry White set out to draft a 
"Suggested Plan for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund 
and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and 
Associated Nations.,,19 "No matter how long the war lasts nor how it 
is won," White wrote in the draft he presented to Secretary 
Morgenthau on May 8, 1942, "we shall be faced with three inescapable 
problems: to prevent the disruption of the foreign exchanges and the 
collapse of monetary and credit systems; to assure the restoration of 
foreign trade; and to supply the huge volume of capital which will be 
needed virtually throughout the world for reconstruction, for relief, 
and for economic recovery." 
19. According to Frank Coe (personal interview, August, 1950), White 
first showed colleagues in the Treasury Department a draft of his plan 
in the late summer or early Autumn, 1941. It was an outgrowth of a 
plan for an Inter-American Bank on which White had worked in 1939. See 
'Robert W. Oliver International Economic Co-Operation and the World Bank 
(London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 92-99. See also Richard N. Gardner, 
Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, expanded edition (New York-McGraw-Hi11 Book 
Company, 1969) p.73. On December 14, 1941, one week after the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, Secretary Morgenthau formally asked White to 
work on plans for a fund and a bank. See Armand Van Dormael, Bretton 
Woods (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978), pp. 40, 45. 
A copy of the draft cited here (April, 1942) may be found among the 
White Papers. It has been reproduced as Appendix A of International 
Economic Cooperation and the World Bank. 
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Clearly the task can be successfully handled only through 
international action • • • • It is high time that • • • plans be 
drafted • • • • Such agencies should, of course, be designed to 
deal chiefly with postwar problems. But their establishment must 
not be postponed until the end of hostilities • • • • 
• • • • No one knows how soon the war will end, and no one can know 
how long it will take to get plans approved and the agencies 
started. Yet, if we are to 'win the peace,' which will follow the 
war, we must have adequate economic instruments with which to carry 
on effective work as soon as the war is over • • • • 
• • • there is an additional important reason for initiating at 
once serious discussion of specific proposals. Such a discussion 
will be a factor toward winning the war • • • • The people of the 
anti-axis powers must be encouraged to feel themselves on solid 
international ground, they must be given to understand that a 
United Nations victory will not usher in another two decades of 
economic uneasiness, bickering, ferment, and disruption •••• 
Finally, they must have assurance that the United States does not 
intend to desert the war worn and impoverished nations after the 
war is won, but proposes to help them in the long and difficult 
task of economic reconstruction. 
* * * * * * * * * 
A vital part of that promise rests on international monetary and 
banking collaboration. The United Nations and the Nations 
associated with them must undertake co-operatively two tasks as 
soon as possible; first, to provide an instrument with the means 
and procedure to stabilize foreign exchange rates and strengthen 
the monetary systems of the United Nations; and second, to 
establish an agency with resources and powers adequate to provide 
capital for economic reconstruction to facilitate rapid and smooth 
transition from wartime to peacetime economies, to provide relief 
for stricken peoples during the immediate postwar period, to 
increase foreign trade and permanently increase the productivity of 
the United Nations. 
These two tasks should be kept distinct. Though in some of their 
facets and in many of their consequences there is considerable 
interdependence and interaction, the two are different enough to 
call for separate instrumentalities • • • • To supply the United 
Nations with necessary capital not otherwise available except 
possibly on too costly terms should be the function of a bank 
operated for that specific purpose; whereas monetary stabilization 
• •• would best be performed by a stabilization fund created to 
perform that special function. 
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It is therefore recommended that immediate consideration be given 
to formulating plans for the establishment of two separate 
institutions: 
1. A United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund, and 
2. A Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and 
Associated Nations. 
* * * * * * * * 
It will perhaps help toward understanding and induce a more 
sympathetic approach to the proposals which follow to state at the 
outset that something much more than the usual banking and 
stabilization functions are envisaged in the plan. There is 
urgent need for instruments which will pave the way and make easy 
a high degree of co-operation and collaboration among the United 
Nations in economic fields hitherto held too sacrosanct for 
international action or multinational sovereignty, a breach 
must be made and widened in the outmoded and disastrous economic 
policy of each-nation-for-itself-and-the-devil-take-the-weakest. 
Just as the failure to develop an effective League of Nations has 
made possible two devastating wars within one generation, so the 
absence of a high degree of economic collaboration among the 
leading nations will, during the decade, inevitably result in 
economic warfare that will be but the prelude and instigator of 
military warfare on an even vaster scale. 
Following this introduction, White presented outlines of his 
proposed fund and bank. While they were less detailed than the 
Articles of Agreement negotiated at Bretton Woods, they were, in the 
main, similar. 
Of the two proposed organizations, the Fund was the more 
central to American policy. The Treasury (or Central Bank or 
Stabilization Fund) of every member country would have the privilege, 
at its own discretion, of purchasing from the Fund (with its own 
currency) any currency held by the Fund, provided: 
a. The currency demanded from the Fund is required to meet adverse 
balance of payments to the country whose currency is being demanded. 
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b. The sum in the Fund of the currency of the country making the 
purchase shall be, after adding the sum proposed to be purchased, 
not more than 100 percent of the total sum -- gold, currency, 
and notes -- originally contributed to the Fund. 
c. The rate of exchange shall be the one determined by the Fund. 
Each country was assigned a quota or subscription of which 25 
percent would be paid to the Fund in "cash" -- one half in gold and 
one half in local currency. Another 25 percent would be paid in 
interest-bearing government securities which, presumably, could be sold 
by the Fund for local currency or gold. The remaining 50 percent 
would be callable by the Fund in such form and rate as it might choose. 
It would appear from this formula that a member government might 
purchase, at its own discretion, other currencies equal, at official 
exchange rates, to 87 1/2 percent of the local currency value of its 
quota. 
Beyond that, the Fund, at its discretion, might purchase more 
of the deficit country's currency, presumably with gold or other 
currencies, as long as 
a. It is believed the anticipated balance of payments of the 
country in question was such as to warrant the expectation that the 
"excess" would be disposed of within a reasonable time, or 
b. The country in question had gold holdings which, together with 
gold it expected to accumulate within a reasonable time, were 
adequate to replace the excess, and 
c. The country in question agreed to adopt and carry out measures 
designed to correct the disequilibrium in the countrys balance of 
payments, which the Fund recommended -- after careful examination 
of the situation. 
In short, the International Monetary Fund would do for each 
member government much of what a national stabilization fund 
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might do to defend its national currency against depreciation. The 
Fund, at its discretion, could do more, though the Fund could act only 
with the approval of four-fifths of the votes of the member 
governments. 
A noteworthy feature of this early draft (and of the final 
agreement) was the absence of any real discussion of the circumstances 
under which a member government could induce or should allow the value 
of its currency to decline. White sternly specified that "The Fund 
would fix the rates at which it will exchange one member's currency for 
another, and the rates at which it will buy and sell gold with local 
currencies. The guiding principle in the fixing of such rates shall be 
stability in exchange relationships. Changes in rates shall be made," 
wrote White in words destined to induce many more words of 
interpretation, "only when essential to correct ~ fundamental 
disequilibrium, and only with the consent of four-fifths of member 
votes" (underlining added). White was anxious to prevent competitive 
devaluation in the post-war world, but he did not discuss 
fundamental disequilibrium. As a result, surprisingly in retrospect, 
he authored an institution which, for at least two decades, 
countenanced many overvalued currencies (including the dollar) which no 
one quite knew how or when to adjust downward. or by how much. 
It is also a bit surprising that relatively little attention 
was paid to the rationale of the quotas assigned the member countries, 
or to the total. It must be remembered, of course, that the Fund was 
not designed to finance the total foreign trade of its members; it was 
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designed only to finance the excess imports at current exchange rates of 
countries having temporary import surpluses (i.e. temporary basic balance-
of-payments deficits). It was not designed to finance excess imports 
associated with post-war reconstruction or long-run development or due to 
permanently inappropriate (inflationary) domestic fiscal or monetary 
policies. Indeed, it was largely because White's final plan was more 
restrictive in this regard than the alternative Keynes Clearing Union that 
the United States government favored the White plan. Even so, the extent 
to which a country may need special financing to pay for an unexpected and 
temporary balance-of-payments deficit depends not only on such obvious 
factors as the normal volume of its foreign trade and, perhaps, its normal 
total production, but also on such other factors as the nature of its 
exports and imports, the cyclical instability of its trading partners, the 
instability of relevant world prices, the anticipated rate of its economic 
development, and the extent of its reserves and borrowing capacity aside 
from its access to the fund. 
Factors such as these were not taken into account. White's initial 
proposal suggested that the quotas (and voting power) in the Fund, like the 
subscriptions (and voting power) in the Bank, should be determined by a 
formula based on national income. The British argued that the volume of a 
nation's foreign trade was more important, and, in the end, the quotas in 
the Fund and the subscriptions to the Bank took into account national 
income and foreign trade and national pride.20 But the result 
20. Fund quotas and Bank Subscriptions were based upon 4 percent of 
1940 national income and 6 percent of the sum of average exports and 
imports, 1934-1938. They were adjusted somewhat at Bretton Woods to 
26 
was an uneasy compromise, for some Fund quotas have been obviously 
inadequate, and the working Fund has frequently been obliged to arrange 
for supplementary emergency financing. 
But what of the total quotas in the Fund? In 1941, White thought 
the quotas should aggregate $5 billion. At Bretton Woods they were 
established at $8.8 billion ($10 billion for the world). In 1940, 
according to White's calculations, the national income of the United 
Nations was $165 billion, and the annual average of world trade (exports 
plus imports) in the three pre-war years was $48 billion. In 1982, the 
national income of the members of the International Monetary Fund was over 
$10 trillion; world trade was over $3 trillion. If the Fund were still 
trying to stabilize relatively fixed exchange rates, and if the 
relationships between Fund quotas and either national income or world trade 
were roughly correct in 1941 or 1944 -- and 1983, Fund quotas in 1983 
should have aggregated between $300 and $500 billion. The $60 billion 
actually available was inadequate to finance a fixed-but-
adjustable exchange-rate system, and such a system no longer existed. 
suit national proclivities. Nations likely to be debtors sought small 
subscriptions, and nations likely to be creditors accepted larger 
subscriptions. But a great deal of emotion was expressed during the 
negotiations, in part because voting power, and therefore prestige. was 
related to the size of quotas and subscriptions. In the Fund, moreover, 
the amount of foreign exchange a member can purchase in normal circumstances, 
depends on the size of its quota. In the Bank, on the other hand there 
is no relation between the size of subscriptions and borrowing rights. 
Thus many nations wanted large quotas in the Fund and small subscriptions 
to the Bank. For its part, the Soviet Union wanted to be recognized 
through its Fund quota and Bank subscription as one of the Big Three; 
France as one of the Big Five. See Van Dormae1, pp. 179-95; and 
John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries Vol. III, Years 
of War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), pp. 257-71. 
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VI 
In accordance with Harry White's 1941 formula, the total 
foreign exchange which deficit nations could have bought from the Fund 
at their own discretion would have been in the order of $4 billion, the 
exact amount depending a good deal on the ability of the Fund to 
acquire currencies with gold and gold with government securities. 
Since the United States Exchange Stabilization Fund had $2 
billion in gold and the British Exchange Equalization Account had 
assets and a line of credit valued after April, 1937, at £567 million 
(roughly $2.7 billion), the total proposed fund for all of the United 
Nations was not large. But White assumed his Stabilization Fund would 
be supplemented ~~ International Bank which could make or guarantee 
long-term loans to finance the larger, long-term trade deficits 
of nations needing special assistance for post-war reconstruction 
or longer term development. 
White's proposed International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development would have had capital subscriptions aggregating $10 
billion of which $5 billion would have been paid in (half in gold and 
half in local currency), the other half being callable if and as needed 
by the bank to cover defaults. In addition, the Bank would have been 
permitted to issue its own "demand currency notes" backed by the paid-
in securities of member governments and by gold. Assuming, as White 
obviously did in 1941, that the notes of the International Bank would 
be accepted by member central banks in exchange for the local currency 
needed to pay for that country's exports, these notes would have served 
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the same function as newly mined gold in an international gold standard 
system or as S. D. R.s in today's international exchange system: they 
would have been net additions to world money. Depending on the 
ability of the Bank to obtain more gold as backing for these notes (or 
a reduction in the 50 percent gold backing requirement), the lending 
capacity of the Bank could have been several times the Bank's total 
sUbscription. 
The demand currency notes, which White sought to call 
"Unitas," were deleted from the draft proposals which made their way 
within the government from department to department in 1943. 21 
They would sound too radical to Congress, it was thought. But the 
same general result could have been obtained (could still be obtained) 
if the Bank could sell its own bonds (or guarantee private bonds) 
having an aggregate value of several times the unpaid capital 
subscriptions of member governments. In this way, the Bank could 
have obtained funds needed for direct loans, or could have guaranteed 
private loans aggregating more than the total subscriptions 
to the Bank. Thus, the purchasing power of the world would have been 
increased. 
The difficulty was that the Bretton Woods delegates decided 
that the lending and guaranteeing capacity of the Bank should 
21. White later suggested that the name "Unitas" be applied to the 
accounts of the International Monetary Fund. Keynes suggested 
"Bancor" for his Clearing Union. At Bretton Woods the United States 
dollar was chosen instead only to be supplanted in 1967 by "Special 
Drawing Rights." 
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not exceed the total subscriptions.22 Over the years, therefore, 
as a substitute, the sUbscriptions to the Bank have been 
periodically increased (as have the quotas in the Fund), and this has 
enabled the Bank to increase its lending and guaranteeing capacity. 
(It has also subjected the Bank and the Fund to periodic political 
harrassment by national legislatures, particularly the Congress of 
the United States!) 
Since White supposed that this procedure would be followed if 
the Bank were successful, he was not greatly upset by the imposition of 
a lending ceiling. In an elaboration of the August 2, 1943, draft of 
his Bank plan, however, White insisted that '~sia, Europe, Africa and 
South America can for many years profitably use for the creation of 
capital goods $5 to 10 billion of foreign capital each year provided 
they can get it on reasonable terms •••• "23 Thus, it is clear that 
in 1942 White was proposing an international lending institution with 
far more lending capacity than the Bank which emerged from Bretton 
Woods. The Fund could be small and specifically directed, White 
believed, because the Bank would be large and ~ broadly oriented. 
22. As a practical matter, the lending ceiling was even smaller for 
many years, for the Bank could market its bonds (and, therefore, obtain 
more loanable funds) in any given country only to the extent that the 
unpaid subscription of that government served as backing for that 
particular bond issue. 
23. See the White Papers. Given the circumstances of the war years, 
this was a remarkably accurate forecast. In 1965, Irving Friedman, 
Economic Advisor to the President of the World Bank, concluded that $3 
to $4 billion of additional development finance at 1965 prices could be 
used annually by developing countries for the foreseeable future. See 
Oliver, p. 275. 
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Of more importance to White (and to the working Bank) than the 
sources of its funds were the conditions under which the bank could 
make or guarantee loans. White was very specific: the bank could make 
short-term and long-term loans to any participating government and to 
political sub-divisions or business enterprises therein, [only] provided: 
a. The servicing ot the loan is fully guaranteed by the national 
government. 
b. The funds cannot be borrowed from private investors except at 
high rates of interest. 
c. The loan is made only after a careful study and written report 
by a competent committee on the merits of the project and the 
loan. 
d. Only when the Committee's report definitely indicates that the 
loan would serve directly or indirectly to permanently raise 
the standard of living of the borrowing country, except where 
the purpose of the loan is to provide emergency relief for 
devastated areas of war-impoverished inhabitants. 
e. Only at very low rates of interest -- preferably not higher 
than 3 percent, with a schedule of repayment appropriate to 
the project. 
Furthermore, "whenever possible the Bank should guarantee loans made 
by private investors, instead of making loans directly." 
As with the Fund proposal, the Bank proposal sought to solve 
the problems of an earlier time, for the recent international lending 
experience ot American investors, public and private, had not been 
altogether happy. 
At least until the l870s, the United States was a "less 
developed" or "newly developing" country whose annual import surpluses 
were financed by foreign investors. After the l890s, however, the 
long-term foreign debt of the United States began to decrease. Then, 
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during World War I, as the European allies borrowed heavily to finance 
wartime American exports, the United States suddenly became the world's 
second (to the U.K.) greatest creditor nation. 
During 1919, private American loans to refund some war debts 
were important, and in 1920 a tidal wave of private American 
overseas investing began. In 1914, net foreign investments in the United 
States aggregated approximately $5 billion. By 1928, the net private 
long-term claims of the United States against the rest of the world 
totaled some $18 billion, to which can be added $10 billion of 
war debts owed the United States government. About 35 percent of the 
private American loans were to Canada, 25 percent to Latin America, and 
the rest to Europe. 
The flow of American capital to Europe was criticized with 
prescience in 1922 by John Maynard Keynes, and the scope of his concern 
might have been broadened: 
• • • • If European bonds are issued in America on the analogy of 
the American bonds issued in Europe during the nineteenth century, 
the analogy will be a false one; because taken in the aggregate, 
there is no natural increase, no real sinking fund, out of which 
they can be repaid. The interest will be furnished out of new 
loans, so long as these are obtainable, and the financial 
structure will mount always higher, until it is not worth while2!O maintain any longer the illusion that it has foundations. 
24. J. M. Keynes, A Revision of the Treaty (London: Macmillan and 
Co., Ltd., 1922), pp. 161-62. There is some reason to suppose that Keynes' 
warning might have had some relevance to overseas lending in more modern 
times, though there is no reason in theory why only "new" countries can 
generate enough "profits" from the use of borrowed capital to repay foreign 
lenders with interest and still be more wealthy than otherwise. As a 
practical matter, moreover, capital often flows from poor to rich countries 
because the savers in poor countries fear the loss of their capital if they 
invest at home. 
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The illusion was indeed shattered after 1929 when the export of 
long-term American capital declined precipitously, and European 
governments defaulted on their war debts. In the early thirties, the 
outflow of dollars declined further because of the depression and the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff. The predictable result was a wave of foreign 
defaults on dollar obligations, international animosity, and 
Congressional inquiries into causes. 
Defaults on private obligations began in 1931 with the suspension 
of interest on over $500 million of dollar bonds owed by foreigners. In 
1933, over $1 billion went into default. By 1935, sixty percent of Latin 
American bonds were in default as to interest payments. Interest was paid 
in full during the entire depression on almost two-thirds of all foreign 
(including Canadian) bonds held privately by Americans, but the American 
resentment of foreign defaults, particularly defaults by governments on 
the war debts, was substantial. 
The most obvious cause was the huge, sudden reduction in the 
outflow of dollars as American imports and overseas lending declined. 
But other problems were identified. Some investment bankers employed 
thousands of local agents to sell foreign bonds on commission to small 
investors in the mid- or far-west while paying no attention to the way 
in which the money was spent by the foreign borrowers. The commissions 
charged by some bankers were so large that the de facto interest paid by 
borrowers on funds actually received was very high. Some borrowers, Latin 
American governments in particular, financed some projects which did not 
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increase the overall productive capacities of their countries. Much 
private American lending to European governments in effect merely 
refinanced war-time inter-governmental obligations. 
On balance, American attitudes about international investment were 
much altered because of the defaults. During the twenties, Americans 
regarded most international economic matters, including overseas 
investments, as beyond the purview of governments. Even monetary 
management was the concern of central banks, not governments, and gold-
standard rules left little for central banks to manage. After the 
defaults, except for direct investments in resource-oriented private 
enterprises such as oil exploration, long-term capital scarcely flowed 
across national boundaries at all. Thus, to the extent that post-war 
reconstruction and longer run development required private, as distinct 
from government (e.g. Lend-Lease) assistance, private investors would, it 
seemed to Harry White, require government guarantees against defaults. 
Furthermore, if the world were to be improved by long-term private 
overseas investing, governments had to do what they could to see to it 
that borrowed funds were wisely used. This was the essence of the 
World Bank as Harry White saw it. 
With not inconsiderable foresight, White wrote early in 1942, 
Once the combined operations of the Fund and the Bank serve to 
restore confidence in the continued stability of exchanges, and in 
the freedom from restrictions on withdrawal of profits, private 
capital will probably flow in large volume to areas in need of 
capital. At the beginning these foreign investments will take the 
form more likely of branch plants, complete ownership of mines, 
factories and plantations. With the restoration of confidence 
they will assume more and more the form of loans to governments, to 
municipalities and finally to foreign corporations. It is to free 
the tremendous accumulations -- past and future -- of private 
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capital to seek profitable employment in countries that sadly lack 
capital that much of the activity of the Bank should be directed. 
To do so the Bank must pioneer with loans private capital is as 
yet justly too wary to undertake, while at the same time both Fund 
and Bank must seek to develop those conditions in which trade and 
productive capital movements can be expected to prosper. 25 
VII 
White's Fund would have been managed by a small operating 
committee assisted by a technical staff. It would have been a 
powerful committee since it would have had to approve all exchange rate 
changes and the purchase of needed currencies in excess of some 
minimum by deficit countries. The Bank would have been directed by a 
president selected by the Board of Directors. The president and his staff 
would receive loan applications, investigate the probable productivity of 
projects, and supervise approved loan expenditures rather along the 
lines followed by the United States Export-Import Bank. In general. 
however, the Bank would have interfered little with private overseas 
investment. 
White seems to have thought of the Bank rather as a transition 
organization which could finance post-Lend-Lease reconstruction and long-
run development until private capital was able to do the job. 26 He 
stressed the proposition that the Bank should guarantee private overseas 
investments against default rather more than that it should make direct loans 
out of paid-in subscriptions. Indeed, it was White's emphasis on 
25. See "Suggested Plan for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization 
Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and 
associated Nations," reprinted in Oliver, pp. 298-299. 
26. John J. McCloy, the Banks' second president, thought that a 
successful World Bank would work itself out of a job in a decade or so. 
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guarantees that induced the British at Bretton Woods to support the Bank 
plan with enthusiasm. Keynes saw no point in an arrangement whereby 
borrowing governments would make scarce capital available to a bank only to 
borrow back their own funds, but he was persuaded that the greater portion 
(four fifths as it turned out) of each subscription could be held in 
reserve, pledged but not called unless needed to compensate for 
defaults. 27 In this way, the Bank could be truly international without 
requiring large payments by borrowing governments. 
White's emphasis on private capital implied that private market 
assessments ot risks would substantially determine the direction and 
magnitude of international loans, though the staff of the Bank might 
occasionally guarantee a private loan to finance a worthwhile project 
in a not-very-creditworthy country which private bankers might 
otherwise overlook. Of the two organizations, however, the Fund would 
probably have been the more active in the sense of restricting access 
to its resources by governments whose economies were poorly managed. 
For their part, as an alternative, the British proposed a single 
international financial organization which would have been quite passive in 
its dealings with member governments and would, in a sense, have required 
no financial contributions at all. The proposed organization was the 
International Clearing Union drafted by Lord Keynes in the summer of 1941 
after his in1tial Lend-Lease discussions in Washington. 
27. To date, there have been no defaults on direct Bank, or Bank 
guaranteed, loans. 
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Making use of the overdraft principle, more common in the 
United Kingdom than in the United States in 1941, Keynes proposed that 
member central banks of a Clearing Union be permitted, in effect, to 
purchase foreign currencies needed to finance balance-of-payments 
deficits with bookkeeping claims against the Clearing Union. A deficit 
central bank would run up a debit balance with the Clearing Union; a 
surplus central bank, a credit balance. Each national central bank 
would be assigned a quota determined by the volume ot its foreign 
trade,28 the major purpose of which would be to establish a 
maximum debit balance for each central bank. 
Quotas in the Clearing Union would have been like subscriptions 
in White's Stabilization Fund or national stocks of gold in an 
international gold standard system, the major difference being that 
quotas would be costless to create and would require no contributions 
except in the sense that balance-of-payments surplus countries would 
contribute the real goods and services exported in exchange for 
claims having no value in and of themselves. (So it is also, of 
course, with paper money in a national monetary system.) 
The American negotiators quickly perceived that if all members 
but one ran up maximum debit balances, the credit balance ot the 
remaining member would be huge (over $30 billion if all nations were 
28. Keynes proposed that each quota equal 75 percent of the sum of each 
country's average annual exports and imports for the three pre-war 
years. This formula would have made the British quota (and voting 
power) larger than the American. 
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members and $48 billion was the average annual volume of world trade 
from 1936 to 1938), and they suspected that the United States might be the 
only balance-of-payments surplus (credit balance) nation in the 
immediate post-war years. The maximum possible obligation of the 
United States under Keynes's Clearing Union plan would have been $31 
billion, while the maximum possible obligation of the United States 
under White's Stabilization Fund exclusive of his International Bank 
would have been $3 billion, a contrast sufficiently great to discredit 
the Clearing Union plan in the United States. 29 An essential 
difference between the Fund and the Clearing Union was that borrowers could 
only buy currencies from the Fund if they had actually been paid into the 
Fund by other members or if the Fund had purchased them with gold, whereas 
borrowers could, in effect, have purchased currencies from the Clearing 
Union with bookkeeping entries. 
Keynes and his colleagues argued that an excessive balance-of-
payments surplus is no less disequilibrating than a balance-of-
payments deficit. For this reason, surplus and deficit countries 
alike should be charged interest on their credit and debit balances 
with the Clearing Union. Surplus (creditor) countries can arrange not 
to have a surplus balance: they can import more or export less (by 
appreciating their currencies, by raising wages, and therefore, 
29. American bankers also protested that deficit (borrowing) members of 
the Clearing Union would control a majority of the votes. Voting 
rights in the Clearing Union, like those in White's Stabilization Fund, 
would have been based on the size of the quotas, and, during the post-war 
period, most nations would, it was supposed, be borrowers. 
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prices, by expanding income or by lowering import barriers); or they 
can extend loans to importing countries apart from the Clearing Union 
system. 
Keynes denied that it was his intention "to make the United 
States the milch cow of the world " "In fact," he argued: 
the best hope for the lasting success of the plan is the precise 
contrary. The plan does not require the United States or any other 
country, to put up a single dollar which they themselves choose or 
prefer to employ in any other way whatever. The essence of it is 
that if a country has a balance in its favor which it does not 
choose to use in buying goods or services or making overseas 
investments, this balance shall remain available to the Union --
not permanently but only for just so long as the country owning it 
chooses to leave it unemployed. That is not a burden on the 
creditor country. It is an extra facility to it, for it allows it 
to carryon its trade with the rest of the world unimpeded, 
whenever a time lag between earning and spending happens to suit 
its own convenience. 30 
But the Americans remained skeptical. They believed that Keynes' 
suggested quotas were unnecessarily large if currency stabilization in 
the post-reconstruction period were really the objective. They felt that 
too much of the burden of balance-of-payments adjustment was being 
placed on the surplus nation or nations. They were specifically 
convinced that, if adopted, the Clearing Union would make it possible 
for nations to live beyond their means at the expense of the United 
States. Besides, they preferred separate organizations to deal 
with temporary balance of payments problems, on the one hand, and 
longer-run reconstruction and development, on the other. 
30. See Keynes speech before the House of Lords, May 18, 1943, in 
Parliamentary Debates on an International Clearing Union. British 
Information Services (July, 1943), p. 77. 
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Somewhat ironically, neither White nor Keynes sought to 
distinguish clearly between the immediate post-war reconstruction 
period and the more normal post-reconstruction period. As Sir Roy 
Harrod later observed, Keynes "was anxious that big post-war 
reconstruction burdens should be thrown elsewhere, not into the 
permanent institutions,,,31 but, out of deference to the United States, 
Keynes did not discuss the reconstruction problem ~~. For his 
part, White denied that there is ever a "normal" period.3 2 
Also somewhat ironically, many Americans criticized Keynes' 
Clearing Union plan in the 1940s on the ground that deficit nations 
would have had too easy an access to "automatic loans" from surplus 
countries only to argue precisely the opposite in the 1960s when, as a 
deficit nation, the United States sought to provide the International 
Monetary Fund with authority to create the Special Drawing Rights which are 
similar to the overdraft quotas in Keynes Clearing Union proposal. 
VIII 
In the end, at Bretton Woods, the Americans largely had their 
way. Keynes had begun the Lend-Lease negotiations protesting that the 
United Kingdom would have to settle its trade accounts bilaterally with 
its natural trading partners for some time after the war, for its 
international reserves were depleted. He even doubted that a huge 
private dollar loan would help, because he could not forsee a time when 
31. Personal correspondence, September 13, 1953. See also Harrod, p. 533. 
32. See Oliver, p. 118, note 40. 
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the United Kingdom could earn the dollars to repay such a loan.33 Only 
gradually were Keynes and the British won over to the American 
conception of a free-trading, multilaterally clearing, free-market 
oriented world. The British remembered the Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the 
American experiment with dollar devaluation as well as the over-valued 
pound atter 1925 and the flight from sterling in 1931, but they came 
to hope that international reserves would be adequately expanded and 
redistributed after the war so as to permit multilateral clearing. 
Keynes himself came to be excited about the potential of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Through it, 
Keynes believed, nations with inadequate reserves might obtain the 
convertible currencies -- as good as gold -- needed to pay for imports 
essential to reconstruction or growth. So he bowed to the superior 
power of the American experts, and, after Bretton Woods, vigorously 
defended the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and the Fund before a 
skeptical British Parliament. 
Throughout the negotiations, the British remained adamant on 
three points: 
1. The world must not return to an international gold standard 
or any other exchange-rate system which might require a 
national economy to deflate in order to protect its international 
reserves. 
33. See Van Dormael, p. 121. 
2. Each member nation must have access to substantial Fund 
resources at its own discretion. 
3. Each member government must retain the final authority to 
manage its economic affairs, including to determine the value 
of its currency in foreign exchange markets, regardless of the 
representations of an international monetary organization. 
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The Americans agreed that a fundamental balance-of-payments 
deficit should be cured by currency devaluation rather than deflation with 
depression. What the Americans opposed was a currency devaluation which 
gave a competitive advantage to the devaluing country, thereby forcing 
depression or devaluation on other countries. Of course, both sides were 
thinking in the context of the world-wide depression, and this affected the 
arguments. In the world of the 1950s and 60s, currency devaluation was 
needed not to stimulate exports so as to increase output and employment 
but rather to induce a better import-export balance in a high-employment 
country suffering from inflation. In too many instances, moreover, import 
surplus countries avoided for too long both devaluation and the domestic 
measures needed to curb inflation. In short, the Anglo-American 
discussions of the early forties were inconclusive and somewhat out of 
date. 
Eventually, the Americans agreed that creditor (surplus) 
nations do have some responsibility for world-wide balance-of-payments 
equilibrium, particularly in a depression. In the Fund, therefore, if 
the currency of a given country is so much purchased (borrowed) as to 
become "scarce," other countries are permitted to discriminate 
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against the exports of that country. In the post-war years, moreover, 
member governments were permitted unilaterally to devalue their 
currencies by up to 10 percent. 
These American concessions went a long way toward satisfying 
the British. During the post-war transition period, the United States 
dollar was indeed "scarce," and other members of the Monetary Fund were 
obliged to "ration" their imports of American goods and services. In 
the longer run, however, the need for large and frequent exchange-rate 
changes became so acute that par values ceased to have the meaning they 
had had in gold standard days. Indeed, after February, 1973, 
fluctuating rates became the normal condition. It was, in a way, a 
final triumph ot Keynes over White with the Americans (including Milton 
Friedman) in the 1970s defending earlier Keynesian positions about 
exchange-rate changes. 
Until the oil crisis of 1973-74, the amount of foreign exchange 
any Fund member could purchase was circumscribed by the size of its 
quota. It could purchase available foreign exchange equal in value to 
25 percent of its quota (matching its 25 percent gold payment) 
at its own discretion. Beyond that, additional purchases (up to an 
additional 100 percent of its quota) required Fund approval. This gave 
members smaller automatic drawing rights than they would have had 
in Keynes' proposed Clearing Union or, for that matter, in White's 
proposed (1942) Stabilization Fund. But the final accord provided for 
total quotas of $10 billion ($8.8 billion for the nations represented 
at Bretton Woods) rather than the $5 billion initially proposed by 
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White, and this went some distance toward providing adequate 
discretionary borrowing rights for member governments. More recently, 
moreover, a variety of special facilities have been added to the Fund 
permitting some members to borrow considerably more than specified in the 
original Articles of Agreement. 
To the end at Bretton Woods, the Americans insisted that the 
Fund and the Bank should have authority in some matters which, in a 
sense, usurped national sovereignty. Member governments can always 
withdraw from, or ignore, the Fund and the Bank, but members who 
act1vely participate must recognize that their economies are subject 
to some Fund and Bank authority. The more a member borrows from the 
Fund, the more the Fund must be satisfied that that government is 
taking the necessary steps to deal with its balance-of-payments 
disequilibrium. Members who borrow from the Bank must satisfy Bank 
requirements that the funds are usefully used. Increasingly, 
beginning in the late 1950s, the staffs of the Fund and the Bank 
concerned themselves deeply with the internal economic affairs of 
their members, not infrequently in ways which induced headlines in 
the international press. These intrusions would have surprised the 
American delegation to Bretton Woods and would probably have 
infuriated the British, who regarded national economic sovereignty as 
absolute, whatever might be agreed about plans for a Fund and a Ban~ 
In his biography of John Maynard Keynes, Sir Roy Harrod has 
commented: 
The Americans are in the habit of praising private initiative 
and inveighing against paternalistic socialism. In the minds 
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of many Americans, who do not specialize in these subjects, Keynes 
has been thought to be a sort of high priest of the paternalism 
they so much dislike. Yet, when the Americans turn their eyes away 
from their own rights under the Constitution toward the 
international sphere, it is they who have recently tended to be the 
chief advocates of paternalism. It was Keynes who had to fight the 
battle of liberalism against the voracious appetite of the 
Americans for paternalistic interference. Keynes thought of the 
international institutions as setting up a framework within which 
individual initiative could flourish; they were to settle certain 
broad principles of action; the Fund in particular, would establish 
certain drawing rights, but only interfere in their exercise on 
most exceptional occasions. The Americans wanted to give 
meticulous scrutiny to each individual transaction. In all this 
long-drawn-out conflict it appears that Keynes was fighting for the 
philosophy of freedom against the philosophy of regimentation.34 
.This is, of course, not the only interpretation of British-
America differences. Keynes was not so much concerned with the 
economic freedom of individuals and private business units as he was 
with the freedom of a government to act while paying little attention 
to the economic actions of, or the consequences of its own actions on, 
other economies. The Americans were primarily concerned with codifying 
the rules of inter-government behavior in international monetary and 
investment matters so that private enterprise might be guaranteed 
freedom of action unfettered by capricious acts of nationalistic 
governments. 
IX 
Harry White's proposals for a Fund and a Bank went through many 
drafts and many interdepartmental discussions and were the subject of 
34. Harrod, pp. 570-7. 
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many conversations with British experts before they emerged, not 
seriously modified, from the Bretton Woods conference. Throughout, 
White was prepared to modify words and to reconsider policies and 
procedures. He was particularly concerned about Congress. Would 
Congress accept new international organizations possessing some of the 
attributes ot national sovereignty? Through it all, however, White 
remained adamant on two points: voting power must be related to the 
contributions of the member governments, and the Fund and the Bank must 
be truly international. 
British and American experts were always agreed that each 
government's voting power should be more or less proportional to its 
share of the total quotas in the Fund or subscriptions in the Bank. In 
the case of the Bank, it was apparent that the economically larger 
countries would be suppliers of loanable funds and would have to be 
satisfied with the operations of the Bank if the supply were not to dry 
up. One might hope that creditors would judge the Bank on the basis of 
broad economic rather than narrow political criteria, but whether 
investors be people or governments, return on investment will influence 
the willingness to invest. When governments are requested to 
contribute to larger quotas in the Fund or subscriptions to the Bank or 
to replenish the Bank affiliated International Development Association, 
political considerations may influence national decisions. But when 
the Bank arranges to marshall private, loanable funds, efficiency, 
productivity, and credit worthiness are not unimportant. 
From time to time, critics of the Bretton Woods institutions 
46 
seem to imply that the world would be improved if the industrial 
nations provided a pool of funds which could be assigned in some manner 
to low-income countries and used by governments of those countries as 
they saw fit. To be sure, this was the model for European use of 
American Marshall Plan aid, but the Marshall Plan had clear, limited 
objectives, and the recipients of the aid had the internal requisites for 
recovery; they lacked only the means to finance imports while their 
export capacity was restored. In any event, it is quite impossible 
that the American Congress would have approved in 1944 or 1945 or, for 
that matter, 1984 an open ended commitment to finance a development 
bank or contribute to a stabilization fund in which the votes of the 
borrowers exceeded the votes of the lenders. 
White opposed the opposite extreme. The question arose, 
for example, as to the point of having nations pay their currencies 
into a Bank (or a Fund) or vote at all if there is virtually no 
possibility that other nations would ever want to borrow their 
currencies. In the case of currency stabilization, why not limit the 
pool of currencies to the few "key currencies" to which other 
currencies are tied? In the case of development loans, why not let 
the American Export-Import Bank do the job? 
To arguments such as these, White replied that nations will 
not feel responsible to organizations to which they contribute 
nothing. In testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
House ot Representatives in May, 1944, White argued: 
We need agreement among the United and Associated Nations to define 
the parities of their currencies in terms of gold, to keep these 
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parities unless changed after consultation, to avoid competitive 
currency depreciation, and to refrain from restrictive and 
discriminatory exchange practices that hamper the growth of world 
tra~e. To make such arrangements effective, they should be through 
an international institution embracing all interested countries. 
To provide adequate resources and reduce the risk to anyone 
country, funds for helping to maintain stable and orderly exchange 
rates should be subscribed by all countries and should be available 
to member countries prepared to agree to these principles of 
international monetary cooperation. 
The problem of post-war international investment cannot be solved 
merely by the provision of funds by this Government. The revival 
of the free flow of private capital for international investment is 
an international problem. All countries share in the benefits of 
increased production and increased trade that result from productive 
investment. It is only proper that all countries should share in 
the risks. 
The essential aspect of the post-war problem of international 
investment is to assure an adequate flow of private capital for 
productive purposes. This can be done only by aiding and 
encouraging private investors to provide capital through the usual 
investment channels. To do this, private investors must have 
assurance that the funds they provide will be used for productive 
purposes, that the balance of payments of the countries in which 
they invest will permit the servicing of their investments, and 
that their investments will be free of the risks of depreciating 
currencies and exchange restriction. 
An international agency with resources contributed by all 
interested countries prepared to guarantee loans for productive 
purposes can give private investors the assurance they need. 
Where the funds of this Government are to be used for international 
loans on a bilateral basis, this can continue to be done through 
the Export-Import Bank.35 
White might have added that an international organization can 
intrude upon national sovereignty with greater ease and, probably, to 
35. See 'Reconstruction Fund in Joint Account with Foreign Governments 
for Rehabilitation, Stabilization of Currencies, and Reconstruction,' 
Hearings Before the Committee ~ Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives 
Seventy-Eighth Congress, Second Session ~ ~ ~ Res. 226 (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 11. Hearings were 
conducted on April 25, 26, 27, 28, and May 16, 17, 1944. 
48 
better effect than can a national instrumentality. Since it is an 
international body, the World Bank can send missions to borrowing 
nations to investigate loan applications, and it may be able to attach 
specifications and restrictions to its loans which it would be 
difficult for a national government to attach without inviting charges 
of imperialism. As contrasted with strictly private international 
investing, the World Bank may be able to hasten worldwide economic 
development by extending loans on more favorable terms and by being 
able to overcome the imperfections of the market. By more thoroughly 
investigating loans before they are made, the Bank may also 
increase the productivity of the loans. It may even be able to reduce 
the risks of private lending. 
Since it is an international body, the International Monetary 
Fund can impose economic conditions on borrowing governments and on 
lending institutions which are more rigorous than any likely to be 
accepted if proclaimed by national stabilization funds, treasuries, or 
central banks. Indeed, the evolution of the gathering of information 
and the insistence on conditions as prerequisites of Bank or Fund 
loans has been the subject of much discussion and will be, it can 
be expected, the subject of much more. 
Beyond all this, White was fully committed, as were many 
Americans in 1944, to a world in which nation states were subject 
under some conditions to international authority. 
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X 
In January, 1942, at the request of Harry White, during a 
conference of the American States in Rio de Janeiro, Under Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles mentioned White's plan for currency stabilization, 
and the conference passed a resolution recommending that the Ministers 
of Finance of the Governments of the American Republics participate in 
a special conference to consider the establishment of an international 
stabilization fund. White was eager to have a conference that very 
year, but discussions moved slowly within an interdepartmental 
committee of the United States government. The conversations 
between White and Keynes, which began in the fall of 1942, continued 
until the Bretton Woods conference convened on July 1, 1944. White's 
eagerness for early international discussions was thwarted, though his 
dedication to a fully international approach remained. In his first 
meeting with White, Keynes urged that the U.S. and the U.K. work out a 
joint plan betore inviting other nations to participate, but White 
objected that "this would create the suspicion of an Anglo-Saxon 
financial 'gang up.,,,36 Thus, while detailed negotiations 
continued between Britain and the United States, the British kept the 
Dominions and some Europeans informed, the Americans dealt with the Latin 
Americans and the Russians, while the Canadians offered a currency 
stabilization plan of their own -- a sort of compromise between Keynes 
and White. 
36. Penrose, p. 48. 
50 
Negotiations with the Russians were general. They were 
conducted through Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (who had 
succeeded the friendlier Maxim Litvinov in May, 1939, shortly before 
the Russo-German non-aggression pact, which cleared the way for the Nazis 
to attack Poland). A starting point was discussion of reparations and 
international cooperation in the repair of damage to the U. S. S. R.37 
Molotov seemed receptive to suggestions of an international lending 
agency as well as currency stabilization, though he particularly 
wanted international recognition of the Soviet Union as one of the Big 
Three (Big Four, including China, if the Americans insisted.) Indeed, 
the Soviets probably participated at Bretton Woods more for political 
than for economic reasons and lost interest when American reconstruction 
lending became unlikely and the voting formula ranked the Soviets below 
the British and the Americans. 38 
During the spring of 1944, shortly before Bretton Woods, Harry 
White met with representatives of various nations to discuss his Bank 
proposal, at which time the Soviets sought a commitment that the Bank 
would finance Soviet reconstruction on favorable terms. They also 
sought to reduce the gold payments required of countries damaged by 
37. See, for example, the conference between Secretary of State, Cordell 
Hull, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov in 
Moscow, October 29, 1943: Hull, p. 1303. 
38. At Bretton Woods, M. S. Stepanov sought a large quota in the 
Fund and even said that Russia would be glad to present data (on national 
income, trade and gold reserves) which would justify such a quota, but his 
offer was never put to the test. See Van Dormael, p. 195. 
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enemy occupation, to prohibit the inspection of state-trading nations, 
and to guarantee that the U.S., the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and China should 
each have at least 10 percent of the total voting power.39 
Similar representations were made by the Soviet delegation at 
Bretton Woods, where it was agreed that nations devastated by war might 
withhold for five years 25 percent of their quota payments to the 
Fund. At Bretton Woods, the Soviet SUbscription to the bank was increased 
as the Soviets requested. It was also agreed that only 2 percent of each Bank 
subscription need be paid in gold or gold-convertible currencies. (In 
White's 1942 bank draft, 25 percent of each subscription was to be 
paid in gold.) Thus, the Soviets received the concessions they sought 
but chose not to join anyway. In March, 1943, Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull 
• asked [British Foreign Secretary Anthony] Eden whether he 
thought Stalin had any other choice than these two alternatives: 
one, isolation after lopping off certain territory along Russia's 
boundaries, accompanied by the maintenance of heavy armaments; two, 
become part of the world and meet a~l Russia's responsibilities under 
a sane, practical policy of international cooperation. Eden said he 
knew of no other choice. 40 
Many Americans, including Harry White, whose parents had immigrated to 
the United States from Russia, hoped -- in vain as it turned out -- for 
the second ot these alternatives, but Stalin chose the first, and 
Marxists the world over have criticized the World Bank and the Monetary 
39. See the White Papers. 
40. Hull, p. 1247. 
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Fund ever since as capitalist institutions which discriminate against 
socialist governments and remain uninterested in programs designed 
genuinely to benefit the poor. 
After Bretton Woods, even the British were difficult. Keynes 
was annoyed that the headquarters would be in the United States rather 
than the United Kingdom. (At a subsequent meeting, he was additionally 
annoyed that the headquarters would be in Washington, D.C. rather than 
New York.) He was also annoyed to discover after the conference that 
"the par value of each currency of each member share [would} be expressed 
in terms of gold. •• or ••• the United States dollar of the weight and 
fineness in effect on July 1, 1944." Keynes had fought for an abstract 
unit of account such as a ''bancor'' or a ''unitas'' or, though the name was 
not then suggested, a "Special Drawing Right." (As it turned out, 
this American ''victory'' at Bretton Woods made it more difficult than 
otherwise in 1971 to devalue the over-valued dollar.) 
It was the British Parliament which objected most strongly to 
Bretton Woods, however, and, in retrospect, it appears probable that the 
British would have rejected the Fund and the Bank altogether had it not been 
for the $3.75 billion loan negotiated by Keynes and agreed to in Washington 
on December 6, 1945, just three weeks before the expiration date by 
which 65 percent of the quotas in the Fund had to be subscribed if the Fund 
and the Bank were to come into being.41 
41. See Oliver, p. 221; and Van Dormael, pp. 266-71. 
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In late 1944, the Federation of British Industries recommended 
that Britain postpone action on the Bretton Woods agreements. The 
London Chamber of Commerce was critical. There was much conservative 
objection to any British commitment to non-discriminatory trade and to 
any British retreat from a sovereign right of each nation to establish 
its own foreign- exchange rate. There was general animosity to any 
international monetary system which resembled the gold standard the 
British had tried unsuccessfully to preserve in the years before 1931, 
an animosity no less pronounced in the Labor Party which won the 
elections of July, 1945. 
The Economist argued that it was "obvious nonsense" to expect 
any country to commit itself in 1945 to a par value for its currency 
within the limits of 10 percent. 42 Sir Robert Boothby referred to 
acceptance of Bretton Woods as "our economic Munich.,,43 Nevertheless, 
with their backs to the economic wall, offered a dollar loan, which 
they had expected to be a gift, of $3.75 billion, with Winston 
Churchill urging conservatives to abstain and Prime Minister Atlee 
enforcing party discipline, the House of Commons approved the loan and 
the Bretton Woods agreements on December 14 after just two days of 
restricted debate. Reluctantly, with an American loan, the British 
accepted what the Russians, without a loan, rejected. 
The United States was the first nation to ratify Bretton Woods. 
Indeed, there was no point in prior ratification by another nation: 
42. The Economist, July 21, 1945. Cited in Van Dormae!, p. 271. 
43. The New York Times, December 13, 1945. 
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without American participation, the Fund and Bank could not have begun 
operations: most of the unrestricted working capital came from the 
United States, the United States had the largest bloc of votes and was 
the principal sponsor. In subsequent years, moreover, increases in 
Fund quotas and Bank subscriptions as well as replenishments of the 
International Development Association, the soft loan agency of the World 
Bank Group, could occur only with action by the United States. 
The Congress of the United States passed the Bretton Woods Agreements 
Act in July, and President Truman signed it into law on August 4, 1945. 
There was significant American opposition, however, and the 
support of the United States for its own institutional children, 
lukewarm after Bretton Woods, has become almost cold in recent years as 
member governments of the Fund and the Bank have criticized the 
tendency for the "Imperious [American] Economy" to behave with little 
regard for other economies.44 
Some Americans have always felt that the United States 
government should control the dollars made available to the Fund and 
the Bank. For this reason, in 1945, opposition to the Fund was 
intense. The United States could control the Bank, it was 
supposed, because the Bank could lend few dollars without the 
assistance (and acquiescence) of American banks who market Bank, or 
Bank-guaranteed, bonds, and the government of the United States 
44. See David Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1983). 
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could withhold blanket permission for the Bank to lend any dollars at 
all. But the Fund was different. So the question was asked: Why not 
finance currency stabilization as well as post-war reconstruction for 
friendly nations through bilateral Export-Import Bank loans or ad hoc 
Treasury loans like that to Britain? 
The best answer was the One-World answer -- that all nations 
should participate in decisions affecting the world economy. There was 
the powerful additional argument that the agreements accepted by forty-
four nations could probably not be negotiated again. As Sir Dennis 
put the matter in 1943: 
Knowing what we know of the centrifugal focus at work among the 
nations of the world, of the ease with which wills tire and good 
interactions fail, can we doubt that in this, as in the political 
field, it would be wise to lay the foundations while imaginations 
are active and hopes are high. 45 
The opposition of nationalistic American critics was strong. 
President Roosevelt had hoped for congressional acceptance of Bretton 
Woods prior to the San Francisco United Nations Conference in April, 
1945, but that was not to be, and the fledging Truman Administration was 
obliged to lobby hard in July to refute the spirited arguments of 
Senator Robert A. Taft. Had the Bretton Woods bill been introduced 
into the Eightieth Congress elected in 1946, it might well have met the 
same fate as the International Trade Organization. 
XI 
The Fund and the Bank that operate in 1984 resemble, but are 
45. Dennis H. Robertson, 'The Post-War Monetary Plans," Economic 
Journal vol LIII (December, 1943), p. 357. 
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substantially different from, the organizations conceived at Bretton 
Woods. Of the two, the Fund is the more different, for it was 
virtually turned on its head in the 1970s when, led by the United 
States, the world abandoned an international system of fixed-but-
adjustable exchange rates. 
In the late 1930s, many economists supposed that the earlier 
decrease in world trade had been due in part to undue fluctuations of 
exchange rates. The fixed rates of the pre-1914 gold-standard days 
were generally admired. At the same time, it was recognized that wrong 
exchange rates could produce balance-of-payments disequilibrium and 
pressure for domestic contraction in balance-of-payments deficit 
nations. The Br1tish attempt in the 1920s to deflate so as to justify 
a pre-1914 price of gold was regarded as particularly unwise. As 
Keynes put the matter in a speech before the House of Lords on May 23, 
1944: 
We are determined that in the future, the external value of 
Sterling shall conform to its internal value as set by our own 
domestic policies, and not the other way round. Secondly, we 
intend to retain control of our domestic rate of interest, so that 
we can keep it as low as suits our purposes, without interferences 
from the ebb and flow of international capital movements or 
flights or hot money. Thirdly, whilst we intend to prevent 
inflation at home, we will not accept deflation at the dictate of 
influences from outside. 46 
By the 1950s, the logic of Keynes' position suggested to some 
that exchange rates between major trading areas should be allowed to 
46. For the full text of Keynes' speech, see Seymour E. Harris (ed.) 
The New Economics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), pp. 369-79. 
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fluctuate without AnY government intervention so as to produce 
instantaneous and perpetual balance of payments equilibrium regardless 
of the internal fiscal and monetary policies of respective governments. 
Advocates of fixed rates argued, on the other hand, that unstable 
exchange rates would induce a reduction of trade and an undesirable 
movement of international capital into those major countries 
where domestic economic stability was expected. The argument continues 
to this day. In theory, of course, rigidly fixed exchange rates are 
consistent with balance-of-payments equilibrium only if domestic prices 
and outputs in the constituent economies are reasonably stable and are 
expected to remain so. By the same token, it has been argued, stable 
domestic prices and output in the constituent economies of the 
international system should produce stable exchange rates even in the 
absence of intervention by governments. Unfortunately, world 
conditions since 1973 have not permitted a test of the latter 
proposition. 
White and Keynes agreed at Bretton Woods that, with the 
assistance of the International Monetary Fund, governments would 
intervene in exchange markets to prevent exchange-rate fluctuations 
due to temporary balance of payments disequilibrium, while fundamental 
disequilibrium would be dealt with by exchange-rate changes. But no 
one defined "fundamental disequilibrium," and no one specified a fool-
proof procedure for identifying correct new exchange rates or a method 
for guaranteeing that destabilizing forces would not continue after the 
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change. Thus, from 1949 through 1973, "fundamental disequilibrium," 
however defined, occurred again and again only to be "cured" 
inadequately by changes in exchange rates. When a fundamental 
disequilibrium in the payments of the United States became apparent in 
1971 and the United States was unwilling or unable to adjust its 
internal economy to solve the problem, the system had to be redesigned. 
In the period of post-war reconstruction, most governments 
found it necessary to restrict the use of their own national 
currencies in international exchange, and in such a world it made 
little sense to talk of "temporary" or "short run" balance of payments 
disequilibria. In such a world, exchange-rate stability was achieved 
by exchange controls -- the very practice Harry White had sought to 
outlaw -- rather than by the measured, though marginal, intervention of 
stabilization funds in exchange markets. For at least a decade after 
the war, therefore, the International Monetary Fund seemed to have no 
purpose except to gather information about exchange restrictions. 
Gradually, however, the dollar ceased to be scarce. Indeed, in 
the early 1960s, as American investors sent dollars into exchange 
markets to buy the local currencies needed to finance American 
investments abroad, the world began to experience a sort of dollar 
glut. More and more currencies became freely convertible, at least to 
pay for imports, and stable, equilibrium exchange rates mattered a 
great deal. In such a world, the International Monetary Fund also 
mattered a great deal. 
Governments of many nations, large and small, rich and poor, came to 
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the Fund to borrow other currencies so as to finance balance-of-payments 
deficits everyone hoped would be. temporary. Sometimes a deficit was 
temporary; in time, the borrowing government could easily buy back its own 
currency with the currency it had borrowed, spent, and then earned. Sometimes 
it was not so easy. Sometimes strong deflationary measures were needed at 
home to reduce the national demand for imports and, therefore, foreign 
exchange. Sometimes the payments deficit persisted until the nation's 
reserves were depleted and further borrowing from the Fund seemed inadvisable 
or impossible, in which case the alternatives were devaluation or exchange 
controls or both. Frequently devaluation seemed to come too late. Sometimes 
devaluation seemed to make a payments imbalance worse, at least in the short 
run, and if it worked in the longer run, it had to be accompanied by new 
deflation to reduce domestic demand. 
Disequilibrium in the payments of the United States began to 
be apparent as early as 1958 when foreign central banks, which had 
been buying dollars not only to support the dollar but also to rebuild 
their international reserves, began to exercise their legal rights to 
buy gold from the United States at $35 an ounce. This was a sign that 
they regarded their dollar reserves as adequate for the time being and 
that the day might come when the dollar price of gold might rise. 
(Only the United States among the major powers was committed by law to 
trade gold for dollars at a fixed price. That had been the rationale 
at Bretton Woods for the proposition that one-fourth of each nation's 
quota should be paid in gold ~ dollars and why dollars were widely 
regarded as being "as good as gold," and vice versa. Indeed, for 
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twenty five years before 1959, the dollar had been generally regarded 
as better than gold in the sense that, at $35 an ounce, many foreign 
central banks generally preferred dollars.) 
After 1958, the continuing payments deficits of the United States 
were financed by foreign central banks through purchases of dollars or 
United States Treasury gold. According to the discipline of the gold 
standard, the domestic economy of the United States was supposed to 
contract enough in nominal terms so that an export surplus would fully 
offset its net outflow of long-term capital. Instead, the economy 
expanded -- through real growth at first and then, after 1966, in part 
through price inflation. By March 15, 1968, when official Gold Pool 
sales of gold to private traders were suspended, there was ample evidence 
that the dollar was overvalued relative to gold. By 1971, when the 
United States developed a merchandise trade import surplus for the first 
time since 1871, there was a prime facie case that the dollar was 
overvalued relative to the trade-weighted average of other currencies. 
In the absence of considerable domestic restraint, the 
Keynesian solution was a decrease in the external value of the dollar, 
but that solution was opposed throughout the 1960s for a number of 
reasons. It appeared difficult to decrease the value of the dollar 
relative to other currencies without raising the dollar price of gold, 
and the dollar and gold, tied together, were a central value about which 
the values of other currencies were supposed to fluctuate. Furthermore 
American authorities did not want to reward the Soviet Union and South Africa, 
major gold exporters, by raising the dollar price of gold. Foreign 
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exporters to the United States did not want the dollar price of their 
exports to rise. Many observers regarded the payments deficits of the 
United States as the best way to increase the international reserves 
of the world, in any event, and there were signs well into the 1960s 
that the world needed more liquidity to finance its rapidly growing trade. 
In the end, on August 15, 1971, after unprecedented foreign central 
bank purchases of dollars, the Nixon Administration insisted that the 
external value of the dollar be allowed to decline. The Treasury 
Department suspended gold payments to foreign central banks, and the dollar 
floated downward to be stabilized again on December 17 (at the Smithsonian 
Institution in Washington) by international agreement at a new trade-
weighted value relative to other currencies of about 8 percent below what 
it had been on August 14. The seemingly impossible had been accomplished: 
a modified fixed-but-adjustable exchange-rate system was still intact, and 
the dollar had been devalued. 
The calm which ensued preceded a new storm, however. As the United 
States economy grew rapidly in 1972, the underlying price inflation, concealed 
briefly by wage and price controls, reappeared. So did the payments deficit. 
In March, 1973, the major trading nations of Europe and Japan withdrew support 
for the dollar, and the dollar began to float in response to market forces, as 
it continues to do today.47 
47. For a detailed account of these events, see Robert Solomon, The 
International Monetary System 1945-1982 (Revised Edition) (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1982). See also John S. Odell, ~~ Monetary Policy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982.) Significantly, 
the American gold window remained closed; the Treasury Department 
continued to refuse to exchange gold for dollars at any price even 
though the official dollar price of gold was set at $42.22 an ounce. 
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Needless to say, the consequences of these events for the 
International Monetary Fund were substantial. The Articles of Agreement 
had to be rewritten, the changes being collectively referred to as the 
Second Amendment which became formally effective on April 1, 1978. Instead 
of the proposition that "each member undertakes to collaborate with the 
Fund to promote exchange stability," a new Article IV committed 
members to "a stable system of exchange rates," which meant that member 
governments undertook to manage the internal affairs of their countries so 
as to promote stable though flexible exchange rates. (A member 
government might employ a par-value exchange-rate system so long as the par 
was not expressed in gold, and "other exchange arrangements of a member's 
choice were also acceptable.)48 
A major effect of the Second Amendment has been to remove gold 
from the center of the system. Par values and quotas are now expressed 
in "Special Drawing Rights,,49 rather than in gold or a gold-convertible 
currency (e.g. the dollar). Indeed, the Fund has disposed of much of 
the gold which has been paid to it by its member governments. In place 
of the discipline of the gold standard, moreover, the Fund itself has 
sought from time to time to oversee the exchange-rate policies of its members, 
inducing governments to intervene in exchange markets when necessary to obtain 
"correct" exchange rates and to employ "correct" domestic economic 
------48. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Rules of the Game (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), p. 238. 
49. A Special Drawing Right is the right of a government member of the 
Fund to exchange a book keeping claim against the Fund (an SDR) for 
currencies acquired by the fund as the result of the payment by government 
members of their quotas. Thus, a member might buy Japanese yen with SDRs 
and use the yen to finance a trade deficit. The value of 
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policies, though the Fund is bound to "respect the domestic social and 
political policies of members." 
Events since 1973 have precluded "a stable system of exchange 
rates." As anyone who has followed the recent international discussions of 
Latin American debts or the United States balance of trade can testify, 
moreover, the concept of a correct exchange rate has become even more 
clouded than it was before 1973, and the role of the Monetary Fund has 
become even more controversial. It was once supposed that, given full 
employment without inflation in the various trading nations (internal 
balance), correct exchange rates would be consistent with a rough equality 
of visible and invisible exports and imports (external balance); if exports 
and imports were unequal, the balance would be financed by equilibrating 
movements of long-term capita1.50 It was even supposed that, in the longer 
run, long-term capital would flow from capital-rich or developed (low-
interest-rate) to capital-poor or underdeveloped (high-interest-rate) 
an SDR is a weighted average of the values of German marks, French 
francs, British pounds, Japanese yen and U. S. Dollars. The SDR can 
decline in value relative to a basket of commodities, but is likely to 
fluctuate in value less than anyone of is component currencies or, for 
that matter, gold. 
SDR claims can be created by the Fund with the 85% majority 
approval of its members (rather like fiat money is created by a 
government) whenever the collective reserves of the member countries 
are judged to be inadequate. They were "invented" in 1967 by the First 
Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the Fund primarily to provide 
a new international reserve asset or, as the French insisted, a new 
international line of credit, which would supplement gold, the supply 
of which could be increased only by mining (or price appreciation) and 
dollars whose supply held by foreign central banks could be increased 
only by official settlements United States balance-of-payments 
deficits. See Solomon, pp. 128-50; and Dam, pp. 151-169. 
50. See, e.g., the classic work by J. E. Meade, The Balance of 
Payments (London: Oxford University Press, 1951). 
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countries. A sort of natural order would operate to distribute 
properly the production and the moveable resources of the world, and 
the Law of Comparative Advantage would insure that each region would 
produce that array of goods which would provide for it the greatest 
possible gain from its trade with other regions. 
In terms of this idealized model, exchange rates since 1973 
have been neither stable nor correct. Indeed, since 1981, the dollar 
has shown that a currency can remain historically high in spite of an 
historically high United States current-account deficit; and capital 
can be attracted away from low-income to high-income regions more or 
less indefinitely. It is an Alice-in-Wonderland world. Given the 
instability of the price and output levels of the major world economies 
since 1973, it is not surprising that exchange rates have been 
far from stable, but the knowledge that exchange rates can fluctuate 
widely has added a sort of "bandwagon effect" which tends to produce 
exaggerated fluctuations. Expectations of instability may also have 
intensified the search by international investors for a long-run 
relatively stable international asset (e.g., the dollar) thereby 
inducing exchange rates which lead to current account imbalances 
and invite distortions of comparative advantage. 51 • 
In such a world, the role of the International Monetary Fund 
51. For a summary of the growing literature on the factors which may 
influence exchange rates in a floating rate regime, see John 
Williamson, The Open Economy and the World Economy (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1982), pp. 106-245. For a discussion of the effect of 
exchange rates on the structure of trade. see International Monetary 
Fund, Exchange Rate Volatility and World Trade, Occasional Paper 28, 
July 1984. 
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can hardly be the same as it was. There is no longer stored in the psyche 
of the Fund the concept, however vague, of balance-of-payments equilibrium 
against which temporary imbalances can be compared and, if necessary, 
offset by Fund financing. The Fund has largely become a sort of crisis-
management lending institution of use largely to developing countries 
suddenly unable to finance imports at accustomed levels. 
A payments crisis may be due to a sudden decrease in the world 
price, or the quantity, of a nation's major export commodity, a sudden 
increase in the price of a major import commodity (e.g. oil), a sudden 
reduction in the international flow of funds needed to finance imports 
(as in the current debt settlement crisis), or a sudden increase in the 
costs of borrowing. It may be all four. In such a crisis, an 
international organization may be of assistance not only in providing 
accommodating finance itself but also in encouraging the provision of 
accommodating finance by member governments and private lending 
institutions. 52 The staff of the Fund may also work with a be1eagered 
government to suggest domestic policies which may alleviate the crisis 
over time, and the beleagered government .!ru!Y find it easier to accept 
these suggestions precisely because they ~ from ~ international ~. 
52. In order to be of greater assistance in managing financial crises, 
the Fund has created a number of special funds which enable governments 
to borrow more than they could under the original quota system. See 
"IMF Survey" The Economist, September 26, 1981, after p. 54. See also 
IMF Survey, (The International Monetary Fund), November 1982; and 
recent International monetary Fund Annual Reports. Since the World 
Bank has inreased its lending to finance the payments deficits of some 
of its members, the division of authority between the Fund and the 
Bank has become less clear. See, for example, "The Bretton Woods Twins," 
The Economist, 15-21 September, 1984, pp. 17-18. 
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If the solution requires an increase of exports before the 
nation's imports can rise to earlier levels, the advice of the Fund 
may seem harsh: it is almost certain to involve currency 
devaluation and the reduction of domestic inflation, and the 
reduction of domestic inflation is almost certain to require a 
reduction in the government's fiscal deficit and the rate of 
increase of money wage rates. Unless wage contracts can be 
renegotiated downward quickly, moreover, anti-inflationary policy is 
likely to be accompanied in the short run by rising unemployment. 
But these are the consequences of shifts in an economy as it moves 
from a high to a lower level of inflation and from an import to an 
export surplus. In such a case, the Fund is not the cause but the 
expeditor of the solution of the problem. 
Be that as it may, and even though the Fund operates 
somewhat differently today from the Fund agreed to at Bretton Woods, it 
performs a useful function. If the Fund did not exist, it would 
probably have to be invented, for short-term fluctuations in the 
flow of international payments are no less likely in a world of 
fluctuating, than of fixed, exchange rates, and international 
reserves are no less important in smoothing the transition. In 
gathering information and negotiating with creditors and debtors 
alike, moreover, the Fund performs a function which can best be 
performed by an international organization. And it is far from 
clear, in this era of international political confrontation, that 
international agreement on a wholly new short-term international 
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lending organization could be obtained even if a better one, in the 
view of some, were proposed. 
XII 
Like the Fund, the World Bank operates today in ways not 
intended at Bretton Woods. Harry White originally supposed that the 
World Bank would make loans to member governments by issuing notes 
which would be backed by the subscriptions of member governments and, 
therefore, in part by gold. The notes would have been convertible 
into national currencies as needed to help finance the import of 
borrowing (developing) countries. (This arrangement could be put 
into practice today if S. D. R's were issued by the Fund to the Bank 
and then loaned by the Bank to borrowing governments.) But the note 
issuing idea was quickly dropped. 
At Bretton Woods, it was supposed that the Bank would make 
some loans directly from paid-in subscriptions, but that most of its 
loans would be of funds borrowed in the capital markets of its 
members, each member's subscription serving as collateral. For 
nearly forty years this was the Bank's primary mode of operation. 
During the early years the Bank sold its bonds in the financial 
markets of the United States and loaned the dollars it borrowed. In 
the early years, therefore, the success of the Bank depended heavily 
on the esteem in which it was held by New York investment bankers 
and, of course, on the unpaid SUbscription of the United States 
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government, the size of which provided a ceiling on the Bank's 
borrowing and, therefore, its lending capacity. More recently, the 
Bank has borrowed heavily in Japan, Switzerland. Germany and the 
OPEC nations where interest rates have tended to be lower than in 
the United States. By pooling its borrowed funds and using its own 
interest-free paid-in capital and earnings, the Bank is able to 
offer its borrowers long-term interest rates which are usually below 
three-month Euro-currency rates. 
At Bretton Woods, it was also supposed that the Bank would 
assist the flow of capital to low-income countries by guaranteeing 
private loans. Indeed, this was the idea which won Keynes' support 
for the Bank. He saw no point in pretending that the war-devestated 
or the underdeveloped nations could make capital available to finance 
reconstruction or development, but he took it to be quite reasonable 
that all governments could join in making up the losses, if any, of 
private investors who had made loans for Bank approved projects. 
This procedure was not used in the post-war world. Private 
investors were too suspicious; they would buy World Bank bonds more 
readily than foreign government bonds guaranteed by the Bank. After 
the oil crisis of 1973, private bank loans to the wealthiest 
developing countries became available without World Bank guarantees 
occasionally, it may be added, to finance projects which might not 
have met World Bank standards. Bank-guaranteed private loans to 
finance development may become more important in the future. Since 
1974, in fact, the Bank has joined private banks and national export-
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credit institutions in a considerable amount of co-financing. 53 
Occasionally, the Bank has even sold a seasoned loan to private buyers 
thereby freeing funds for its own new loans. 
In the 1950s, the absorptive capacity and the credit 
worthiness of prospective borrowing countries were so much in doubt 
that the Bank had trouble lending a few hundred million dollars a 
year. Today, in contrast, the World Bank Group lends $15 billion a 
year, and its officers indicate that it could usefully lend more if it 
had access to more loanable funds. 54 
The really important change in the Bank's approach to 
development finance came with the institution, in 1960, of the Bank's 
sister organization, the International Development Association, the 
staff and officers of which are the same as the Bank's but whose 
charter is different. IDA extends zero-interest-rate, 50-year loans 
to the governments of the lowest per-capita income countries (below 
$411 in 1981 dollars). It does so not because the projects financed 
are less productive than than Bank financed projects but because the 
borrowing countries' growth rates would be too low if repayment on 
anything like commercial terms were required. Since some of each 
53. See the World Bank, Annual Report, 1983. p. 18. See also 
"World Bank Survey," The Economist, September 4, 1982. 
54. From 38 members in 1946, the Bank has grown to 144 members. Its 
authorized sUbscriptions have grown from $8.8 billion to $75 billion. 
Of the recent increases in total subscriptions, only 7.5 percent (in 
contrast to the original 20 percent) must be paid in. This has made 
possible an increase in the Bank's borrowing and lending capacity 
without a corresponding increase in payments by member governments. In 
addition, consideration is being given to permitting the bank to lend a 
total amount in excess of its total subscriptions. 
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new Bank loan is offset by payments of principal and interest on past 
loans, moreover, annual net IDA lending sometimes exceeds annual net 
Bank lending. 
IDA turned the philosophy of the World Bank upside down. 
Before IDA, the Bank preferred to deal with the developing nations with 
the highest per-capita incomes -- the most able to pay. After IDA, the 
World Bank Group paid particular attention to the clients with the 
lowest per capita incomes -- the least able to pay. This was contrary 
to the intentions of the American and British treasury experts who 
drafted the Bank plan. They had supposed that market interest rates 
would guide the direction of the international flow of capital and that 
the Bank would encourage private capital by insuring that borrowed 
funds were wisely used. 
The long-term international capital movements of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries had helped to finance the development of most 
of North America and some parts of Latin America, Asia and Africa --
those parts where the prerequisites of growth were present and where, 
therefore, the rates of return on capital were high. That pattern of 
development was interrupted by World War I, resumed only partially in 
the 1920s, and halted altogether in the 1930s. As with the Fund, 
therefore, the Bank was intended to be an instrument through which an 
earlier epoch could be regained. 
In its earliest days, the working Bank operated as a true bank 
in the sense that it waited for loan applications and expected the 
applying governments to justify their requests. The few loans that 
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were made financed low-risk energy and transportation projects 
in obviously creditworthy countries. Gradually, however. it became 
apparent that development in those parts of the world in which private 
capital had not been attracted required more active Bank participation 
in the development process. It required concessionary finance for the 
poorest countries and a whole new literature describing and analysing 
the development process. It was not enough merely to say that economic 
growth requires additions over time to the stockpile of capital. 
From a passive bank, therefore, the World Bank has evolved into 
an active development organization which substitutes itself for the 
long-run capital market in much of the developing world. The staff of 
the Bank identifies potentially productive projects, including projects 
such as schools, housing and family planning which increase the 
stockpile of human, in contrast to physical, capital. The staff ranks 
potential projects and identifies their complimentarity and their 
balance-of-payments effects. It investigates its predictions after 
projects have been completed so as to refine the techniques of 
prediction. It even provides a school in which the bureaucrats of its 
member developing countries can learn about development. All of this 
would probably have surprised the drafters of the Bank's Articles of 
Agreement. 
Like the Fund, the Bank has considerable influence over its 
member governments. The Bank has been known to withhold loans to 
governments whose fiscal or monetary policies seem to reduce that 
country's credit worthiness. It has refused to deal with 
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governments which do not negotiate with private lenders about 
defaults. On the other hand, it cannot oversee the implementation 
of each financed project in such detail as to preclude all graft. 
Thus, the Bank is sometimes criticized not only for interfering in 
the domestic affairs of its member states (e.g., by encouraging 
private rather than government enterprise55 ) but also for 
interfering too little (e.g., to insure that the needy benefit from 
bank 10ans56 ). Like the Fund, the Bank has its detractors. 
particularly Marxists, on the one hand, and extreme exponents of the 
Free Market, on the other; but, like the Fund, if the Bank did not 
exist it would probably have to be invented. 
The Bank gathers an enormous amount of useful information 
about the economies of its clients. The professional literature about 
economic development is a great deal more sophisticated than it was 
before the Bank began actively to involve itself in development 
planning and assessment. While the roughly $30 billion in long-term 
claims of the Bank against the non OPEC less developed countries 
is a small fraction of the roughly $700 billion outstanding 
indebtedness of those countries, the Bank has played a 
disproportionately large role in developing the world. 
55. See Teresa Hayter. Aid ~ Imperialism (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 
1971). 
56. See Cheryl Payer, The World Bank. A Critical Analysis (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1982). For a more balanced view, see Robert L. 
Ayres, Banking Qg the Poor (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1983). 
See also Andrew M. Kamarck, "The World Bank and Development: A 
Personal Perspective," Finance and Development, December, 1984. 
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XIII 
The one area in which the Bank was clearly inadequate was in 
the postwar reconstruction of war-devestated economies. This 
deficiency was ironic, since reconstruction was the first order of 
business for a bank whose full title is the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Indeed, at Bretton Woods, at the 
insistence of the Eastern European delegations (in opposition to the 
Latin American delegations), words were added to the first purpose of 
the Bank: 
To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories 
of members by facilitating the investment of capital for 
productive purposes, including the restoration of economies 
destroyed ~ disrupted ~ war. the reconversion of productive 
facilities to peace time needs. and the encouragement of the 
development of productive facilities and resources in less developed 
countries. 57 
The Bretton Woods Conference ended on July 22, 1944. Germany 
surrendered on May 8, 1945. A nuclear weapon was dropped on Nagasaki 
on August 9. The Bretton Woods Agreements were ratified by the 
requisite 65 percent of the weighted votes of the Bretton Woods 
signatory powers on December 14, and the Inaugural Meeting of 
the Fund and the Bank convened the following March 8. Two months 
later, the Executive Directors of the new international organizations 
began to meet in a new building in downtown Washington, D.C. 
located on H Street across from the old State Department building and 
57. See Oliver, p. 184. The words underlined were added at Bretton Woods. 
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originally intended for State Department use. But preparations for 
Bank lending were painfully slow. 
On June 4. 1946. Eugene Meyer, publisher of the Washington Post, 
became the Bank's first president and the search for a staff 
began. On June 25, member governments were notified that 2 percent of 
their subscriptions would be due within sixty days and that an 
additional 3 percent would be due on November 25. By May 26, 1947, the 
full 20 percent of each member's subscription which could be called was 
paid in full. Of this, however, just slightly more than $700 
million was in United States dollars authorized for direct use by 
the Bank. It was not until July 15. 1947, that an additional $250 
million was obtained by the Bank through the sale of its first bonds. 58 
By this time the need for a Marshall Plan was evident. 
On March 5, 1946, at Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill 
warned: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an 
iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie 
all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe." 
Stalin had remained oblivious to the protests of American negotiators 
that he was violating his agreement at Yalta to 
• assist the people in any European liberated state • • • to 
form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all 
democratic elements in the popUlation and pledged to the earliest 
possible establishment through free elections of governments 
responsive to the will of the people •••• 59 
58. See Oliver, pp. 246-49. 
59. For a critical discussion of the Yalta Conference, see W. W. 
Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York, Harper & 
Brothers, 1960), p. 109. 
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Indeed, Communist parties in France and Italy threatened to move the 
Iron Curtain westward. 
When Secretary of State George Marshall returned on April 
28, 1947, from a meeting in Moscow of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers. he asked George Kennan to set up a State Department 
Policy Planning Staff which quickly concluded that the 
rehabilitation of Western Europe, including the restoration of 
German output, was of urgent importance.60 On June 5, at Harvard 
University, the Secretary of State formally proposed the Marshall 
Plan. Reconstruction lending by the World Bank would be too little 
and too late. As Bank President John J. McCloy would say, the Bank 
compared to the Marshall Plan was like a rowboat compared to the 
Queen Elizabeth.6l 
In 1947, the Bank did make four reconstruction loans: to 
France ($250 million), the Netherlands ($195 million), Denmark ($40 
million), and Luxembourg ($12 million). By January, 1948, the Bank 
also had loan requests from Chile ($40 million), Poland ($600 million), 
Italy ($250 million), and Yugoslavia ($500 million). By then, however, 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was in the business 
of using Marshall Plan funds to assist in the recovery of Western 
Europe, and the Bank had decided that, due to "existing political 
60. Kennan, p. 222. See also Acheson, pp. 236-35. 
61. Oliver, p. 239. 
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difficulties and uncertainties," loans to Eastern Europe could not be 
made. 62 
Could the Bank have financed European reconstruction? 
Judging from the events of 1945 through 1948, the answer would appear 
to be "No," and one may conclude that Harry White and his 
colleagues in the United States Treasury Department in 1944 were naive 
in supposing that it could. It is not impossible to understand their 
reasoning, however. They hoped that the Bank and the Fund could be 
established quickly and that the lending capacity of the Bank 
would be greater. They supposed that immediate postwar reconstruction 
and relief would be substantially financed by a continuation of war-
time Lend Lease and by ad hoc United States government loans. 
They also assumed that the postwar world would be peaceful, that trade 
barriers would be relaxed, and that private capital would respond 
favorably to stable exchange rates and freely convertible 
currencies. It was an "impossible dream" only in the short run. 
XIV 
In the words of Professor Jacob Viner, the Americans who 
participated in planning for the post-World War II world were 
• • • trying to reverse the whole trend of policy and practice of 
the world at large in the field of international economic relations 
since 1914 and especially in the ill-fated years since 1929. [They 
were] attempting to do this, moreover, in the face of a skeptical 
world, undecided as to its objectives, and in particular lacking 
solid faith in the virtues of a pattern of international economic 
62. See Oliver, p. 245. See also Thomas G. Patterson, Soviet 
American Confrontation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), pp. 
130-36. 
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collaboration which can be reconciled with difficulty, if at all, 
with the comprehensive national planning of domestic economies to 
which most of the governments [were] strongly committed. 63 
They sought to make trade barriers as moderate and 
nondiscriminatory as possible, to provide for international 
collaboration aimed at high level employment and stable exchange 
markets, and to encourage the flow of long-term capital from capital-
rich to capital-poor areas. They desired the participation by all 
nations in international organizations which could provide the 
international macro-economic climate within which market forces could 
operate to promote the welfare of the planet. Seldom, if ever, had 
political economists had such an opportunity to shape the destiny of 
the world. 
Out of the chaos of the 1930s came the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Out of the horror of World War II came the United Nations Organization 
and, later, the European Economic Community and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Nor were the aspirations of the postwar planners denied. In 
spite of the Cold War, Korea and Viet Nam and the structural 
disequilibrium induced by the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, the real 
commodity output of the world has increased four fold since World War 
63. In Murray Shields (ed.,) International Financial Stabilization, A 
Symposium (New York: Irving Trust Company, 1944); reprinted in Jacob 
Viner, International Economics (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), 
p. 133. 
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II; the real commodity trade of the world, six fold.64 Even though the 
population of the world has more than doubled -- from approximately 
2.2 billion in 1950 to 4.5 billion today, living standards have 
risen substantially on the average (not equally in all regions),65 
and the signs of political, cultural and economic integration abound. 
Looking back at the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference held forty years ago at Bretton Woods, one may be confused 
by conflicting emotions. Given the economic and financial problems 
confronting the world in 1984 and the current criticisms of the Fund 
and the Bank (either for being too prudent or too imprudent), one may 
discount Bretton Woods and advocate modified, if not altogether new, 
international monetary and financial institutions. Looking back on the 
post-World-War-II history of international monetary affairs, on the 
other hand, one may applaud the wisdom of the Bretton Woods 
negotiators as well as the abilities of the managers of the Fund and 
the Bank to adapt their organizations to the needs of their times. 
Perhaps the most notable heritage of Bretton Woods is the 
international character of the Bretton Woods institutions. It is the 
international character of the Fund and the Bank, as well as their 
pocketbooks of loanable funds, which allows their officers to deal 
effectively with the governments of their member nation states. The 
64. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, International Trade 
1982/83 (Geneva, 1983), p. 203. 
65. A popUlation of 6 billion is projected for the end of the century. 
Living standards have increased the least in Black Africa, though even 
there the record is mixed. 
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One-World approach of the New Deal remains as the most indelible mark 
of that era. 
Franklin Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and his global 
perspective was replaced in Washington by a commitment to an Atlantic 
Alliance as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Under Harry Truman the 
foreign policy role of the Treasury Department rapidly diminished. 66 
Almost as rapidly Soviet-American animosity grew. A week after 
Roosevelt's death, Averell Harriman, the American Ambassador in Moscow, 
warned Truman that the Soviets intended to extend their control over 
neighboring countries. Less than two years later, Will Clayton, the 
wartime Assistant Secretary of State, warned that '~he countries under 
Communist pressure require economic assistance on a large scale if 
they are to maintain their territorial integrity and political 
independence. "67 
As the Big-Three wartime collaboration faded, suspicions of some 
individuals grew. On August 21, 1945, Elizabeth Bentley began to report to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation about a spy ring which, she said, 
included Harry White. Shortly thereafter, White was placed under FBI 
surveillance. Though the evidence was insufficient in 1947 to warrant a 
Federal Grand Jury indictment, the FBI concluded that White gave United 
States Treasury Department documents to a group which included N. G. 
66. See Rees, ~ cit., particularly pp. 315-22 and 350-426. 
67. This summary of Clayton's unpublished memorandum is taken from 
Gardner, ~ cit., p. 300. 
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Si1vermaster, a Treasury Department colleague of White, who photographed the 
documents and passed them to Soviet agents. Indeed. photographs of four 
pages of notes in White's handwriting later turned up among the documents 
plucked by Whittaker Chambers from his famous pumpkin. In his biography of 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., on the other hand, 
Professor John Morton Blum says of White: 
He appointed some assistants who were almost certainly 
members of the Communist Party, ••• and those assistants, in 
White's view were as free to pass along information about 
Treasury policy to the Russians as was Averell Harriman, for 
example, free to talk to the British. But White himself did not 
hew to the line of the Communist Party 68 
White's career began to decline after President Truman accepted 
Morgenthau's angry resignation on July 5, 1945, just before the Potsdam 
Conference. White stayed on as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to Fred 
Vinson, who succeeded Morgenthau, but his influence waned, in part because 
the atom bomb seemed to render mute the issue of whether the "industrial 
disarmament" of Germany. advocated by White and Morgenthau, was needed to 
prevent a third World War. Indeed, in a few years, a restored West Germany 
would be sought after as a member of the Atlantic Alliance. 
On January 23, 1946, President Truman nominated Harry White as the 
first United States Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund. 
This came as a bit of a surprise because it had been widely anticipated that 
White would be the Managing Director of the Fund, but FBI Reports about 
White were already being sent to the White House. On February 6. White was 
68. Blum, Roosevelt and Morgenthau, p. 46. 
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confirmed by the United States Senate, and the confirmation stood, even 
though Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes and Secretary of the Treasury 
Fred Vinson were that very day discussing a new FBI report about White. 
White resigned as Executive Director of the Fund on Harch 
31, 1947.69 In May, he moved to New York City and then to a 
small farm in New Hampshire from which he commuted occasionally 
to New York. In September, 1947, he suffered a severe heart 
attack and was unable to testify in October at a Grand Jury 
investigation of Elizabeth Bentley's accusations. The following 
August (1948), White voluntarily appeared before the House 
UnAmerican Activities Committee and read a statement which denied 
the accusations of Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers. He 
added a ringing affirmation of lithe American creed"70 which drew 
applause. The next day, however, on his return by train to New 
Hampshire, he was taken ill with chest pains. Two days later, 
on August 16, 1948, he died at his summer home at Blueberry Hill. 
69. In February, just two months before White resigned as 
Director to the Fund, John J. McCloy, a prominent Wall Street 
lawyer, agreed to serve as the second President of the Bank. 
This was a bit of an irony, for McCloy had represented the War 
Department in interdepartmental discussions of American 
occupation policy in Germany while Harry White had represented 
the Treasury. In September, 1944, the ~furgenthau (Treasury) Plan 
for dismantling German industry, substantially drafted by White, 
was approved by President Roosevelt over the objections of the 
War and State Departments. Roosevelt's vague decision was later 
reversed by Harry Truman, and, as High Commissioner to Germany 
beginning in 1949, McCloy helped to direct a German recovery 
which was greatly at variance with that sought by Morgenthau and 
White. American foreign policy was being directed by a new team. 
70. See Rees, ~ cit., p. 412. See also Van Dormae1, pp. 306-7. 
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Even at the height of his career in the Treasury Department, 
Harry White had detractors. He was said to be arrogant and aggressive. 
British negotiators found him overbearing. Some State Department 
officials resented the intrusion of the Treasury Department into 
foreign affairs. From the vantage point of the Cold War, 
moreover, the One World notions of White and his colleagues 
seemed naive. White did not foresee that the super-powers of the 
world, each believing that it had won the war, would confront 
each other, each seeking to expand its hegemony beyond its pre-
war boundaries. But he was not alone. Two months before his 
death, White commented: 
• • • I doubt if any responsible official of the member 
governments in spring of 1944 believed that by 1948 -- and only 
three years after the cessation of hostilities -- the tensions 
between certain of the major powers would have been so pronounced 
and that the world, instead of drawing together during these years, 
would have moved so precipitously toward a split ••• 71 
By September 11, 1947, when the Second Annual Meeting ot the 
Fund and the Bank convened in London, the management of these 
organizations had set a course which would eventually make them 
indispensable to the peace and prosperity of the world. By then Keynes 
was dead, White had resigned, the Marshall Plan had been proposed, and 
the Bretton Woods organizations were facing a decade of 
relative inaction as the postwar transition proceeded in ways not 
foreseen at Bretton Woods. In 1947, the Fund and the Bank looked 
71. Cited without a source by Rees, ~ cit., p. 391. 
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a bit like anachronisms whose time had passed before it had ever 
arrived. The foundations were strong, nevertheless, and the structures 
grew, in part because they were international in their origin and outlook. 
They were conceived in the spirit of One World. 
Even today the notion persists that the people of the world must 
share the only liveable planet we know. It is a notion with a history 
which includes the negotiations at Bretton Woods four decades ago. 
